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From Verdict to Judgment:
The Evolution, Confusion and Reformation of
CPLR Articles 50-A and 50-B
STEPHANIE L. ARGENTINE*
INTRODUCTION
Structured settlements have become increasingly popular in the lat-
ter part of this century. This popularity has been fueled by escalating
verdicts and the growing judicial acceptance of evidence concerning rates
of wage growth and the effects of inflation on future earnings. These
factors have united with favorable tax reform provisions and advocacy by
commentators' to encourage many jurisdictions2 to enact statutory pro-
visions which mandate or encourage the periodic payment of judgments.
The decision to enact structured judgment legislation may also be re-
garded as a desperate response to the insurance crises of the 1980s. This
article is particularly concerned with the New York structured settle-
ment statute, CPLR Articles 50-A and 50-B [hereinafter Article 50], but
in order to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the statute and
* J.D. Candidate, SUNY at Buffalo School of Law, May 1993. The author would like to thank
Professor Kenneth F. Joyce for his guidance and comments and LeRoy T. Watkins, F.S.A., F.C.A.,
for his mathematical calculations. In addition, she is especially grateful to her mentor William S.
Reynolds, Esq. for assigning her the project three years ago that led to this article and for his unfail-
ing support. Finally, she wishes to thank her editors, Michael Griffen and Maxine Lee, without
whom this article would not have been possible.
1. The MODEL PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT was approved by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1980. The National Conference established a
special committee in 1977 and its drafts of the Act were circulating for years prior to 1980. Roger C.
Henderson, Periodic Payment of Bodily Injury Awards, 66 A.B.A. J. 734, 736 (1980). In 1975, the
American Bar Association established a commission to examine these issues and in a 1977 report,
recommended that state legislatures authorize judges to enter judgments which utilized periodic
payments. Insurance Chapter From the 1977 Report of the American Bar Association Commission on
Medical Professional Liability, 1978 INS. L.J. 22-23. See also Jerrold M. Hillard, Alternative Recov-
ery Methods: Structured Settlements and Periodic Payment of Judgments, 34 FED'N INS. CoUNS. Q.
237, 262-63 & nn.112-14 (1984) (discussing the growth of commentary on the periodic payment of
judgments).
2. According to the Prefatory Note to the UNIFORM PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JuDGMENTS ACT,
in 1980 elective or mandatory statutes had been enacted in 14 states. By 1990 when the Uniform
Act was approved, more than 30 states had enacted some legislative scheme for the periodic payment
of judgments. UNIFORM PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT, Prefatory Note, 14 U.L.A. 8
(Supp. 1992).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the author's recommendations for reform, it is first necessary to examine
the policies behind damage awards and the evolution of structured settle-
ments. These areas will be addressed in Part One.
Courts nationwide have utilized a variety of methodologies to arrive
at structured settlements which take into account various inflationary
components and discounting methods.3 These methodologies, as well as
the relevant underlying financial, economic and mathematical concepts,
will be discussed in Part Two. An in-depth critique of these methods,
however, is beyond the scope of this article.
In Part Three, the text of Article 50 and the few cases that apply it
will be closely examined. This section will focus primarily on the
problems concerning the appropriate treatment of inflation and discount-
ing. The language of the statute does not clearly specify the appropriate
mathematical model to be followed; the cases instead use several of the
formulations discussed in Part Two. The complex interaction of Article
50 with other statutory provisions will be examined in passing since the
courts seem to be coping with these complexities fairly well.
Although some have recommended or demanded repeal of CPLR
Article 50,1 this author believes that although the statute is somewhat
flawed, periodic payment of judgments is a concept worthy of being re-
tained. To this end, Part Four will offer recommendations for amend-
ments to Article 50 which will simplify its language, lead to greater
judicial efficiency and more accurately reflect the economic realities of
inflation, wage growth, discounting and individual differences.
PART ONE
Damage Awards and the Historical Approach to Discounting and
Inflation
As a fundamental common law principle, any person injured due to
the negligence of another is entitled to be made whole.5 This is most
3. See, eg., William F. Landsea & David L. Roberts, Inflation and the Present Value of Future
Economic Damages, 37 U. MIAMi L. REv. 93 (1982) for an examination and evaluation of six differ-
ent formulations.
4. Joseph Kelner & Robert S. Kelner, Trends in CPLR Articles 50A and SOB, N.Y. L.J., Aug.
27, 1991, at 3, 6; Richard G. Bohner et al., Report by Richard Bohner, Merle Troeger & Edward
Reich to the Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law Section of the New York State Bar Associ-
ation Regarding CPLR Articles 50-A & 50-B, J. INs., NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. SEC., June, 1991,
at 3, 5.
5. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 901 (1977); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 389-90 (6th
ed. 1990).
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often accomplished through a court-ordered award of money damages,
payable by the tortfeasor to the injured party. Often, "making the plain-
tiff whole" entails compensation for losses and expenses both past and
future, since many injuries have continuing expenses and losses.6 Past
damages have been, and continue to be, awarded and paid in lump-sum
form.7 Future damages are most often awarded in lump-sum form,8 but
they are increasingly being paid in a form other than a lump sum. The
future damage award and its payment schedule require extensive proof of
the amount of loss per year and the corresponding duration of each loss,
as well as extensive computations to arrive at an approximation of future
damages.9 Historically, 10 discounting to present value" has been one of
these computations. More recently, allowances have been made for infla-
tion and wage growth.
1 2
In Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, Co. v. Kelly, 3 the Supreme Court
stated that discounting to present value was the proper method of "limit-
ing the recovery to compensation [for actual damages]."' 4 The Court's
rationale was expressed in terms of the future "earning power of
money."' 5 Although this language could very easily apply to the addi-
6. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.1, at 540 (1973). There are
three types of losses: wage and earning capacity losses, losses resulting from the injury (special) and
pain and suffering losses. All of these may have been incurred in the past and may continue to be
incurred in the future.
7. At common law a single lump sum judgment is provided in the "typical accident case." 2
FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.2, at 1303 (1956).
8. M & P Stores, Inc. v. Taylor, 326 P.2d 804 (Okla. 1958), appears to be the first "other than
lump-sum" case. There, the jury awarded $36,000 "[t]o be paid at $150 per month for 20 years."
This language was originally struck from the verdict, but was reinstated even though it was improp-
erly rendered and received, since neither party objected then nor later claimed it to be void. Id. at
808-09.
9. DOBS, supra note 6, at 551. One commentator has developed a "Step I-Step II" approach.
"Step I" involves predictions which are a function of the plaintiff's personal characteristics: age,
occupation, education and actuarial probability of survival. "Step I" involves discounting and infla-
tionary adjustments of the "Step I" predictions. Michael T. Brody, Comment, Inflation, Productiv-
ity, and the Total Offset Method of Calculating Damages for Lost Future Earnings, 49 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1003, 1004-05 & nn.3-6 (1982).
10. Discounting became the norm around the turn of the century. The Supreme Court ap-
proved the practice in Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916).
11. Present value is "[t]he worth today of funds acquired or spent in the future when these funds
are discounted at a particular rate of interest." SYLVAN D. SCHWARTZMAN & RICHARD E. BALL,
ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 233 (2d ed. 1984).
12. Most often this allowance is done by a computation which compounds an inflation rate
(combines the principal and the inflation rate) upon the amount of the first loss.
13. 241 U.S. 485 (1916).
14. Id. at 491.
15. Id.
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tion of interest to the principal through investment, it is more likely
based upon the economic atmosphere of the Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion Periods, when price levels dropped approximately 40% in twenty-
nine years. 6 Thus, the rationale for discounting originally seemed to be
falling prices, and not the investment potential of money. In other
words, keeping money in your mattress during this period was only
slightly less advantageous than putting it in the bank. The dollar in the
mattress would have gained increased buying power due to deflation; the
one in the bank would have been able to buy more due to deflation and
investment interest.
Escalation of an award to compensate for anticipated inflation is a
practice of more recent origin than discounting. Since one of the histori-
cal bases for discounting to present value was the existence of deflation-
ary price patterns, inflationary calculations were contrary to economic
reality during periods of deflation. This reality contributed to a persis-
tent rejection by courts of inflationary considerations. The economy
from the time of the Civil War through the Industrial Era, World War I,
the Stock Market Crash, the Depression and World War II was generally
unstable, making any economic prediction highly speculative. During
this era, courts were understandably unwilling to consider any effects of
future economic conditions in their damage computations. By the mid-
1950s inflation had become more commonly understood, 7 but because
significant inflation was of relatively recent origin, or considered too
"speculative," courts were still reluctant to allow for inflation."8 It is
unclear why discounting to present value remained in practice through-
16. See John P. Henderson, The Consideration of Increased Productivity and the Discounting of
Future Earnings to Present Value, 20 S.D. L. REv. 307, 309 (1975) [hereinafter Henderson,
Consideration].
17. Since 1950 the GNP (Gross National Product) deflator and since 1954 the CPI (Consumer
Price Index) have not fallen. Note, Future Inflation, Prospective Damages, and the Circuit Courts, 63
VA. L. REV. 105, 105 & n.2 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Future Inflation]. Inflation was running at an
annual average of 2% and less than 2.4% for the 1950s and 1960s, respectively. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Current Labor Statistics, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Nov. 1970, at 76, 93 (Consumer Price
Index). This low level of inflation was likely a factor in the courts' reluctance to consider it. See
Brody, supra note 9, at 1007 n.14.
18. Professor John P. Henderson terms this a "social and economic lag" and states that it "ex-
ists whenever the courts view human behavior in conflict with what is contemporarily in vogue in
society at large." Henderson, Consideration, supra note 16, at 307 n. 1. He lists the following exam-
ples of this phenomena: sexual behavior and The Kinsey Report; "separate and equal" and Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); and capital punishment as a deterrent. Id. This blind
following of precedent is apparent in the case of Sleeman v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., where the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals required a reduction to present value based on precedent, but refused to
allow inflation to offset the reduction since inflation was speculative and inconclusive as a prospect.
414 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1969).
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out this time period. The Supreme Court precedent of Chesapeake was
likely the most significant factor. It seems that the most significant basis
for discounting shifted from deflationary pressures to investment consid-
erations without any perceptible change in the legal analysis.
The retention of discounting and the realization that inflation and
wage growth were not speculative, 19 or at least no more speculative than
discounting to present value, led courts to begin to admit evidence and
permit consideration of the effects of inflation in the computations. Infla-
tionary components can be classified into two types: individual compo-
nents (productivity or "merit" based) and societal components (erosion
of the buying power of a dollar due to price escalation).20 The individual
factors that effect wage growth include educational level, experience, pro-
ductivity levels and collective bargaining agreements or other employ-
ment contracts.21 Societal inflation, on the other hand, is often a largely
self-perpetuating phenomenon,2 2 where people expect prices to increase
and so prices and wages rise to keep up with the price increases, and the
inflationary cycle repeats.
The Growth of Structured Settlements
A structured settlement23 is commonly defined as a settlement
"wherein payments are made in more than one installment."24 Two typi-
cal methods are commonly used to fund a structured settlement:
25
(1) an annuity payable by the liability carrier or purchased from a life
19. Judge Friendly stated that "there are few who do not regard some degree of continuing
inflation as here to stay." MeWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. Ry., 282 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
20. Brody, supra note 9, at 1007-08; Lawrence Hadley & John Rapp, Estimating Future Lost
Earnings: Some Common Problems, TRIAL, Feb. 1985, at 28 (discussing the use of individual-spe-
cific and public data in estimating future lost earnings); Note, Future Inflation, supra note 17, at 107;
Patrick J. Maxwell, Comment, Computing Lost Future Earnings in Light of Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. v. Pfeifer, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 375, 379-80 (1984) (discussing the Supreme Court's use of
"'real' wage inflation" as encompassing individual and societal factors).
21. Maxwell, supra note 20, at 379-80 & n.28.
22. See generally Robert M. Solow, The Intelligent Citizen's Guide to Inflation, PuB. INTEREST,
Winter 1975, at 30, 61 (explaining how public expectations of inflation lead individuals to make
decisions in such a manner which may generate or accelerate inflation).
23. Structured settlement is commonly abbreviated to "structure" in colloquial use.
24. Vasilios B. Choulos, Structured Settlements, in 3 MODERN TRIALS 296, 297 (Melvin M.
Belli ed., 2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter Choulos, Structured Settlements].
25. The most obvious method of funding a structure, where the defendant makes payments
directly to the plaintiff over time, is rarely accepted by courts because it places the risk of defendant's




insurance company or (2) a trust.26
Structured settlements became popular when the obvious advan-
tages of periodic payments of settlements became apparent to members
of both the plaintiff and defense bars. Plaintiffs sought to take advantage
of the tax and financial management aspects of structured settlements.
Defendants were faced with escalating verdicts, sometimes payable to
plaintiffs with highly speculative futures, and an insurance liability crisis.
These forces combined to encourage the use of structured settlements.
The popularity of structured settlements began with cases in which
the plaintiff's future, and hence the amount of damages to which plaintiff
was entitled, was highly uncertain. A leading example of a situation
where unknown and unknowable damages led to the use of structured
settlements is the thalidomide tragedy. 27 Thalidomide is a drug that
causes serious birth defects when ingested during pregnancy. The drug
was developed as a sedative and sleeping aid and was widely prescribed
and distributed to pregnant women for a number of years before its dele-
terious effects on developing fetuses became known. It was subsequently
taken off the market, but a large number of suits were brought against its
manufacturer on behalf of victims seeking damages for their birth de-
fects. Had these cases proceeded to trial, their outcomes could have va-
ried tremendously, with negligible damage awards if juries believed the
predictions of short life expectancy made by defense experts, or enor-
mous awards if juries believed life expectancies to be longer and awarded
large amounts for medical expenses and pain and suffering. Structured
settlements are well suited to such situations by shifting the risks of un-
known life expectancies and other factors to a disinterested annuity com-
pany better able to assess risk and life expectancy.
In other cases, the utility of structured settlements is related to lia-
bility that is uncertain.28 In these cases the risk is "all or nothing,"
26. Marvin E. Verbeck & Stanley J. Michaels, Structured Settlements and the Uniform Periodic
Payments Act, 29 FED'N INS. COONS. Q. 17, 18-19 (1978).
27. Vasiios B. Choulos, Structured Settlement" Cure or Curse?, TRIAL, Nov. 1980, at 73, 73
[hereinafter Choulos, Cure or Curse]. Thalidomide (an effective sleeping aid and sedative) allegedly
caused phocomelia in unborn children. Phocomelia is a congenital limb deficiency which manifests
itself as poor development of the long bones of the limbs with "relatively good development of the
hands and feet" (seal limbs). LUCILLE F. WHALEY & DONNA L. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF PEDIAT-
RIC NURSING 963 (2d ed. 1985). The incidence of congenital malformations reached 100% when
thalidomide was used between gestational days 34 and 50. Id. at 55. The product liability suits
against the manufacturers were settled with the use of structured settlements in 1968. Verbeck &
Michaels, supra note 26, at 18; see also, Annuities to Settle Cases, 42 INS. COUNS. J. 367, 370-71
(1975).
28. Choulos, Cure or Curse, supra note 27, at 74.
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whereas in the cases where damages are certain the risk is one of "how
much." The use of structured settlements when liability is uncertain
removes the plaintiff's risk of non-recovery2 9 and the defendant's risk of
being found liable for a greater amount by virtue of a jury verdict.3"
Large verdicts have become increasingly common, if not common-
place.31 In 1966, only one verdict in the entire United States totaled $1
million or more;32 in 1970 there were eleven such verdicts,33 in 1978
there were fifty-six,34 and by 1980 verdicts of this size were being
awarded weekly in all states.35
Structured settlements aid plaintiffs in preventing premature dissipa-
tion of awards by making payments over time and by more accurately
replicating losses as they actually accrue, 6 thereby protecting against the
potential mismanagement of a large lump sum of money.37 Given the
available data and the burden that such dissipation places on the public
29. Id.
30. The lower cost-higher payout of a structured "compromise" settlement often appeals to
both parties, leading them to reject the traditional cash "compromise" settlement.
31. One commentator has stated that they are occurring with "alarming regularity." Tom El-
ligett, The Periodic Payment of Judgments, 46 INS. COuNS. J. 130, (1979) (quoting Wallace E.
Sedgwick & William C. Judge, The Use of Annuities in Settlement of Personal Injury Cases, 41 INS.
CouNs. J. 584 (1974)). Others have reported that half-million and multimillion dollar verdicts "no
longer represent the exceptional case," Henderson, supra note 1, at 734, and that "[a]wards of one,
two, and three million dollars or more are not uncommon.. .," Verbeck & Michaels, supra note 26,
at 17. These verdict analyses are from the late 1970s. In 1979 in New York, a verdict of $2 million
seemed to be near the upper limit. See Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 423 N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div.
1979). Since then the awards have escalated even further, and courts have upheld gross verdicts of
$15 million, see Ziecker v. Town of Orchard Park, 551 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1989), order and judgment
aff'd upon remand, 553 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App. Div. 1990) and $14,304,042, Harvey v. Mazal Amer.
Partners, 566 N.Y.S.2d 242 (App. Div. 1991). In early 1991, a Kings County jury awarded $27
million to a quadriplegic. The trial judge granted the defendants' motion to set aside the jury verdict
unless the plaintiff stipulated to a reduction to $11,437,400. Ebert v. New York City Health &
Hospitals Corp., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 21, 1991, at 28 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 1991).
32. W.G. Van der Voort & Jeffrey S. Karzen, The Role of the Settlement Specialist, in SETrLE-
MENT AND PLEA BARGAINING 198 (Mary Francis Edwards ed. 1981).
33. Choulos, Cure or Curse, supra note 27, at 296.
34. Id.
35. Charles F. Krause, Structured Settlements for Tort Victims, 66 A.B.A. J. 1527 (1980).
36. See DOaBS, supra note 6, § 8.7, at 570; Barbara B. Kolbach, Comment, Variable Periodic
Payments of Damages" An Alternative to Lump Sum Judgments, 64 IOWA L. REv. 138, 140 (1978).
37. There are many studies which examine and detail the problems inherent in lump sum per-
sonal injury awards or other windfalls, such as lotteries, gambling, and sweepstakes. See, eg.,
Kolbach, supra note 36, at 144 n.50 (citing 1 U.S. RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, WORK INJU-
RIES IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 1938-40, at 176 (1947)); JAMES N. MORGAN ET AL., LUMP SUM
REDEMPTION SETrLEMENTS AND REHABILITATION (1959). Another peril of lump sums, overcom-
pensation or undercompensation for medical costs, can be addressed with a trust fund where the
insurance company replenishes the fund when it is near zero and where the company receives a
reversion if the plaintiff dies. See Hillard, supra note 1, at 245.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
welfare system, it is clear that these problems should not be ignored any
longer.38
The liability insurance crisis39 and various tax reforms have also en-
couraged the use of structured settlements. Large self-insured companies
and insurance companies can get a better deal with less financial manage-
ment expense than can a single claimant,4° thereby helping to reduce
costs and maximize the payout/policy limits ratio.41 This in turn helps
to keep insurance costs down, conferring an additional benefit upon the
public at large.42
Damages received for personal injury have been exempted from tax-
ation under the Internal Revenue Code since its enactment.43 Soon after
structured settlements came into vogue, Revenue Ruling 79-220 added
an increased incentive for plaintiffs to structure their settlements, holding
38. Henderson, supra note 1. This article discusses increasingly large verdicts, the availability
and affordability of insurance, income tax treatment and the improvident disposition of awards as
"important matters... that call for re-examination of how large awards of future damages in bodily
injury cases are calculated and paid." Id. at 734.
39. The crisis is so dire that President Bush in his Budget Recommendations went so far as to
threaten loss of Medicare funds to states which do not enact some periodic payment of judgments
statute. Jerry Geisel, Bush Budget Proposes Malpractice Reform, Bus. INS., Feb. 11, 1991, at 1.
Currently pending are three Congressional bills: S. 1232, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), S. 1123,
102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), and H.R. 2701, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
The New York State Insurance Department stated that "[ulniess major actions are taken soon, it
is clear that the [medical malpractice liability insurance] system will collapse in the not-too-distant
future, with severe impact on New York's health care delivery system." REPORT OF THE NEw
YORK STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTrICE, A BALANCED PRESCRIP-
TION FOR CHANGE vi (1988). See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text (discussing the legisla-
tive history of Chapter 184 of the Laws of 1988).
40. Henderson, supra note 1, at 736.
41. Choulos, Cure or Curse, supra note 27, at 74.
42. Id.
43. I.R.C. § 213(b)(6) (1919) (current version at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 11989)). The
Commissioner may also have been exempting damages for personal injury awards before the first
Internal Revenue Act was passed. Lawrence A. Frolik, The Convergence ofLR C. § 104(a)(2), Nor-
folk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt and Structured Tort Settlements Tax Policy "Derailed", 51
FORDHAM L. REVIEW 565, 568 n.17 (1983). The current statute reads:
SEC. 104. COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES OR SICKNESS
(a) IN GENERAL. - Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess
of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any
prior taxable year, gross income does not include-...
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and
whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sick-
ness; ...
•.Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not
involving physical injury or physical sickness.
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. I. 1989).
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that as long as there is no "constructive receipt" by the plaintiff, the
compounded interest is also tax free.'
PART Two
Growth and Interest Rates
There are many different methods used to calculate the present
value of a damage award. Although these methods can be a source of
disagreement in structured settlements, they are most often not directly
at issue and typically only become an issue in cases of structured judg-
ments.' There is no dearth of commentary, by legal and economic
scholars, on the subject.47 The most confusing aspect of this area is the
number of unfamiliar and often interchangeable terms.
The terms "structured judgment" and "periodic payment of a judg-
ment" are often interchanged. Both terms refer to an arrangement for a
series of payments, rather than a lump sum payment, in satisfaction of a
judgment." "Future value" refers to the total amount due under a struc-
tured judgment. It can also be referred to as the "total pay out,"'49 and
44. This is a tax doctrine whereby "income which is subject to unfettered command of taxpayer
and which he is free to enjoy at his option is taxed to him.... An example would be accrued interest
on a savings account. Under the constructive receipt of income concept, such interest will be taxed
to a depositor in the year it is available rather than the year actually withdrawn." BLACK'S LAW
DIcTIONARY 285 (5th ed. 1979).
45. Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74, the substance of which was later incorporated into
§ 101(a) of the Periodic Payment of Settlements Act, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2605 (1982)
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1982)). Section 6079(b)(1) of the Technical and Miscel-
laneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3709-10 (1988), amending I.R.C.
§ 130, added incentives for the defendant, the annuity company and the plaintiff. The defendant gets
the benefit of a novation, since it is required for the plaintiff to achieve favorable tax benefits. The
premiums are not taxed to the annuity company as income. The plaintiff gets secured creditor
rights. The tax benefits inure to the benefit of plaintiffs by protecting the investment interest from
taxation, if it accrues and is paid via an annuity. In addition to fueling the growth of structured
settlements, these tax benefits for annuity companies have also fueled the growth of companies which
specialize in facilitating structured settlements.
46. The parties negotiating a structured settlement rarely argue over the method of computa-
tion. The only discussion concerns the "bottom line" - the present value, the stream of payments
and the total payout. Inflation and discount rates are also haggled over, but the formulas are not
since only the numbers need to be agreed upon. In a structured judgment, however, the formulas
become central to the plaintiff-defendant battle since the judge ultimately must choose a method or a
formula. Thus, the advocacy is over which formula or method is to be employed, and not the "bot-
tom line."
47. See sources cited supra note 20 and infra note 67.
48. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 82 (5th ed. 1979) (defining annuity as a fixed sum
payable to a person at specified intervals for a specific period of time or for life).
49. See generally James S. Marello, Comment, Periodic Payment Plans: Are Annuities Ade-
quately Protecting the Personal Injury Plaintifffrom Inflation, Providing Accurate Attorney's Fees and
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often has as its components: (1) a baseline amount; (2) a term, or time
period over which payments are to be made; (3) a growth/inflation rate;
and (4) an interest, or "discount," rate. The baseline amount and the
term are generally determined by the trier of fact. The rates of growth
and interest are compounded, with the interest in each successive period
accruing to the sum of principal and interest of prior periods."0
The rates of growth and inflation are two of the most significant and
controversial aspects of future value. Some commentators confuse or use
the terms interchangeably, but they are different concepts and should be
distinguished. Growth increases are commonly termed "merit"" l in-
creases or productivity increases, compensating the individual for losses
most closely related to his or her specific abilities to earn increasing
amounts of money over time.52 Inflation, on the other hand, is used to
refer to compensation for price inflation over time, attributable to
broader societal or macroeconomic factors.
The interest rate is a critical element in discounting, or reducing to
present value, and it is often a source of controversy in the context of
structured settlement determinations. Present value in this context is
simply a determination of how much money must be invested today to
give the plaintiff, the recipient of an award, the amount to which s/he is
entitled at some future time, taking into consideration the rate of interest.
For example, if a plaintiff is entitled to a payment of $11 one year from
today, and the prevailing rate of interest is 10%, an investment by the
defendant of $10 today will be sufficient to allow the plaintiff to receive
that $11 payment in one year. 3 In other words, $10 today, invested at
Promoting the Compensatory Goal of our Tort System?, 12 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 271, 273 (1985)
(discussing future value and its relationship to cost in the context of annuities).
50. SCHWARTZMAN & BALL, supra note 11, at 226.
51. Note, Future Inflation, supra note 17, at 107.
52. Henderson has listed four factors which influence the rate at which earnings increase:
"(1) the educational attainment of participants prior to their entry into the labor market; (2) the
influence of age upon the earnings of participants over their life cycle; (3) the significance of produc-
tivity and growth, and (4) the impact of inflation." Henderson, Consideration, supra note 16, at 312.
The first three of these four factors relate specifically to the individual and are affected by different
variables than the fourth factor which is a broader term. Note, Future Inflation, supra note 17, at
106. This subject is discussed in greater detail in John P. Henderson, Income Over the Life Cycle:
Some Problems of Estimation and Measurement, 25 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 15 (1974).
53. Gary A. Anderson & David L. Roberts, Economic Theory and the Present Value of Future
Lost Earnings. An Integration, Unification, and Simplification of Court Adopted Methodologies, 39
U. MIAMI L. REv. 723, 732 (1985) [hereinafter Anderson & Roberts, Economic Theory]. Schwartz-
man and Ball have defined present value as "[t]he worth today of funds acquired or spent in the
future when these funds are discounted at a particular rate of interest. The result may be a single
amount or a series of amounts paid over a given period of time." SCHWARTZMAN & BALL, supra
note 11, at 233.
[Vol. 40
CPLR ARTICLE 50
10%, is the equivalent of $11 in one year. This concept can be expressed
by the formula:
FV $11 $11
PV - = =$10
1 + k 1 ± 10% 1.10
where PV is the present value, FV is the future value and k is the prevail-
ing interest rate.
Contrary to the beliefs of many lawyers and other non-economists,
complex present value computations are not matters of mere arithme-
tic.54 The computations for future value and present value are typically
combined into one formula, often called a present value formula, even
though it reflects both processes. These formulas are very sensitive to
small changes in input values.5" They are particularly sensitive to any
alterations in the inflation and discount rates, since these figures are often
subject to exponential calculations56 which have the effect of magnifying
any error in the original choice of input upon which they operate.
5 7
The nominal, or market, rate of interest encompasses two compo-
nents, one which reflects profit on the investment and one which reflects
the anticipated rate of inflation.58 This latter factor protects the buying
power of the lender's money while the borrower has it for his use. The
first component is the true rate of return for the lender. But the nominal
rate is not the simple sum of the real interest rate and the anticipated
inflation factor, since the lender must also protect the buying power of
the interest 9 of which the lender has also lost temporary possession and
54. Landsea & Roberts, supra note 3, at 121.
55. Id. at 98-101. These two commentators state that "[tihis sensitivity is often underesti-
mated" and "is often the reason why, for the same case, two economic experts may arrive at widely
different estimates of the present award deemed appropriate." Id
56. The growth and discount rates have the time period as an exponent. In the example infra
note 57, "2" or "2.1" would be the rate and "10" would be the time period.
57. This is the sensitivity to which supra note 55 and the accompanying text refer. For example,
2'0 is 1024 and 2.110 is 1667.99. Thus, in this example, a change in the base number of 0.1 results in a
change of 643.99.
58. There may be an additional factor of risk which may come into play. Although this author
is unsure that this is not entirely accounted for in the real rate, at least one commentator has stated
that this risk factor does not enter into the formulas used in the context of damage awards because
the courts assume a risk-free investment. Brody, supra note 9, at 1009.
59. Anderson & Roberts, Economic Theory, supra note 53, at 730. These authors consider i +
i(k,) as representing the premium for expected price inflation. Id
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use. As such, the nominal interest rate (k) is the sum of the real interest
rate (kr), the inflation rate (i) and the product of the two (i(k1)), i.e.,
k = kr + i + i(kr). 6°
Hence, the nominal or market rate of interest is the rate at which lenders
are willing to lend money, and at which borrowers are able to borrow
money, in an inflationary economy. The real, or below-market interest
rate, is the rate that would prevail if there were no inflation.6'
The same nominal/real distinction also exists with respect to growth
in earnings rates. Earnings grow because of personal and societal factors,
such as increased productivity and inflation. 2 Consider the case of a
wage increase of 8.15%, granted during a period of 5% inflation. The
rate of nominal growth in earnings may be expressed by the equation
g = g, + i + i(gr)
where g, is the real growth rate, g is the nominal growth rate, and i is the
rate of inflation. Solving for gr,
g - i 8.15% -5% 3.15%
1 + i 1 + 5% 1.05
yields the rate of real growth in earnings, or 3%.63
This relationship between nominal and real rates is referred to as the
"Fisher effect," after the economist Irving Fisher, who described this re-
lationship in his book, The Theory ofInterest.64 This article will make no
attempt to explain or analyze the Fisher effect, but it is clear from Profes-
sor Fisher's formulas that growth in the rates of earnings and interest are
related, co-varying65 due to the fact that both contain a term for expected
future inflation. This relationship is widely recognized and utilized by
economists and financial analysts, although it is not universally
60. 1d
61. 1d at 729. The real interest rate (Ik) can also be expressed as:
k-i
This expression is obtained by solving the equation in the text accompanying note 60 for k,. Id. at
730.
62. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
63. The numbers for this example have been taken from Anderson & Roberts, Economic The-
ory, supra note 53, at 731.
64. IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREsr 399-451, 493-94 (1930).
65. Note, Future Inflation, supra note 17, at 128. Co-vary appears to be a corruption of a statis-
tical term, "covariance," which measures the interdependence of paired variables. HEWLETr-PACK-





Judicial Applications of the Methods
Courts have utilized many different methods for reducing awards to
present value. 67 The Traditional Approach uses a nominal discount
rate6 8 and ignores the potential for growth in earnings. The Penrod Ap-
proach is a variation of the Traditional Approach, where sometimes a
real growth rate may be used in conjunction with the nominal discount
rate. The Nominal Rates Approach, also referred to as the Independent
Incorporation Method, the Simultaneous Growth and Discount Ap-
proach, or the Inflate/Discount Approach, utilizes the nominal growth
rate and the nominal discount rate. The Alaska Approach, also known
as the Total Offset Approach, is characterized by its assumption that any
growth in earnings is completely offset by the discount rate. The Feld-
man Approach assumes a 0% growth rate and is applied with a real
interest rate. The Modified Feldman Approach assumes a 0% nominal
growth rate and sets the discount rate as the difference between the nomi-
nal discount rate and the expected nominal growth rate. This approach
is also known as the Partial Offset or Net Discount Approach. The final
approach to be discussed will be the Annualized or Average Annual
Damage Approach. In this approach the first year loss is inflated using a
growth rate yielding a stream of increasing payments. This stream is
then summed and an average annual loss is computed. This new average
is then used as the periodic payment, creating a series of equal discounted
payments.
66. Fisher postulated that the real rates are generally constant and that the adjustment for fu-
ture price inflation evidences itself in the nominal rate. There are some real life limits on this adjust-
ment, namely that inflation is not totally foreseeable and that it may take some time for the
adjustment to occur. Note, Future Inflation, supra note 17, at 129. There is criticism of Fisher and
his theory that the adjustment for future price inflation is completely reflected in the nominal rates.
See John A. Carlson, Short-Term Interest Rates as Predictors of Inflation: Comment, 67 Am. ECON.
REv. 469 (1977).
67. The following articles each discuss at least three of the various approaches: Landsea &
Roberts, supra note 3; Anderson & Roberts, Economic Theory, supra note 53; Brody, supra note 9;
Note, Future Inflation, supra note 17; Maxwell, supra note 20; James R. Eck et al., Present Value of
the Future Income Stream: Testing the Experts' Methodologies, FoR DEF., July 1986, at 28.
68. The prior section of this article used the term "interest" rate and the symbol "k" to refer to
the rate of return on an investment. This is in keeping with economics texts. Courts, however, use
the rate of return on an investment to "discount" awards. Thus, courts refer to this rate as a "dis-
count" rate and the formulas use the symbol "d." Although the terms interest (k) and discount (d)
are often used by different authors to refer to the same concepts, they will be used in this article in
accordance with their respective sources.
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In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer,69 the Supreme Court ap-
proved the use of three of the above approaches for calculating damage
awards in federal cases: the Nominal Rates Approach, the Feldman/
Real Interest Rate Approach and the Alaska/Total Offset Approach.
Economists Gary A. Anderson and David L. Roberts have written that
these three approaches favored by the Supreme Court are all mathemati-
cally equivalent, contrary to the Court's belief that the various
approaches will yield differing present values.70 This mathematical
equivalence only occurs if the input parameters are correctly defined and
estimated by the trial court.71 Most judges, however, do not want to turn
a damage calculation proceeding into a "graduate seminar on economic
forecasting"'72 and this timidity results in a lack of uniformity and
precision.
An exposition of the intricacies of the various approaches is not inte-
gral to this article and is omitted. The sources that appear in the foot-
notes may be consulted if more detail is desired. Although formulas for
the approaches are not critical to an understanding of the concepts, they
have been set forth in the footnotes because they aid in a comparison of
the approaches and because some readers may be interested in them.73
The Traditional/Penrod Approach
The Traditional/Penrod Approach74 greatly favors the defendant by
its failure to account for any potential growth in earnings. This omission
was historically based on the perception of trial courts that inflation was
"speculative. ' 75 The unfairness of this approach is apparent when one
considers that a portion of the nominal discount rate is based on an ex-
69. 462 U.S. 523 (1983).
70. Anderson & Roberts, Economic Theory, supra note 53, at 727, 734 tbl.l.
71. Id at 727.
72. Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 971 (1981).
73. In addition, these formulas were used to calculate the present value of a hypothetical $1
million verdict to be paid $50,000 a year for twenty years. See infra note 96.
74. This approach can be expressed as follows:
N X.(1+ g- gy N X.
Pv = =
t= 1 (I +d)' t = 1 (1 +d)y
where PV equals the present value of expected future damages, X. is the level of damages at the
beginning, d is the annual discount rate, N is the number of years over which damages will be
incurred and t is a variable which goes to N and represents the compounding of d. Landsea &
Roberts, supra note 3, at 107.
75. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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pectation of future price inflation.7 6 The Traditional/Penrod Approach
was finally overruled due to this bias in favor of defendants. 77 In Doca v.
Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A. the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit pointed out that although all may not agree on whether gov-
ernmental action could erase the "strong and persistent ' 78  inflation
inherent in our economy, it would take "Draconian measures, at the very
least ' 79 for inflation to be completely eliminated.
The Nominal Rates Approach
The Nominal Rates Approach has support in the economic commu-
nity80 and from at least one court."1 This method takes the damage
award, projects the yearly amount of the award at the compounded
growth rate, discounts each of these yearly values at the discount rate
and totals the discounted figures to arrive at the final present value of the
entire award. A criticism of this approach is that it requires numerous
cumbersome calculations, 2 but the formula is capable of being program-
med into a computer or moderately sophisticated calculator for simple
application.
76. Landsea & Roberts, supra note 3, at 106.
77. Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
Here the Fifth Circuit recommended four other approaches: Nominal Rates, Real Interest Rate,
Offset and Average Annual Damage. Id Due to mathematical inaccuracies, the Average Annual
Damage approach is highly biased in favor of plaintiffs. Culver I was reversed in Culver II, where
the Fifth Circuit finally settled on the Real Interest Rate Approach. 722 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984), and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
78. 634 F.2d 30, 37 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981).
79. Id
80. Landsea & Roberts, supra note 3, at 94 and Eck et al., supra note 67, at 31, both list this
approach as their preferred method based on its accuracy. This approach also avoids any criticism
that may be attached to the Fisher effect, the accuracy of co-variancing and any of the differential




where PV equals the present value of future damages, X. is the level of damages at the beginning, g is
the expected annual damage growth rate, d is the annual discount rate, N is the number of years over
which damages will be incurred and t is a variable which goes to N and represents the compounding
of g and d. Landsea & Roberts, supra note 3, at 97.
81. The United States District Court, Northern District of New York, adopted this method in
its analysis of the proper way to apply CPLR Article 50. Frey v. Chester E. Smith & Sons, Inc., 751
F. Supp. 1052 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). The Supreme Court also gave this approach its approval in Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer. 462 U.S. 523, 544-548 (1983).
82. Eck et al., supra note 67, at 29.
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The Alaska Approach
In its purest form, the Alaska Approach 3 assumes that the rate of
growth in earnings and the discount rate completely cancel each other
out." This effectively sets the growth rate equal to the discount rate.
Since the discount rate is in reality normally greater than the earnings
growth rate, this approach favors the plaintiff.8 5 Support for this ap-
proach is often based on its predictability, accuracy and efficiency. 86 The
efficiency and predictability are clear, since there are no computations to
be performed other than a multiplication of the initial award by the
number of years, but the accuracy of the approach has been questioned.87
The Differential Rate Approaches
The Feldman/Real Interest Rate Approach and the Modified Feld-
man/Net Discount Approach are both differential discount, or partial
offset, methods. They differ only in their assumptions regarding growth
rates. The Feldman Approach assumes a 0% growth rate and then sets
the discount rate at the nominal discount rate minus price inflation (k -
i).88 The Modified Feldman also sets the nominal growth rate at 0% but
then subtracts the nominal growth rate from the nominal discount rate to
83. The formula for this approach is as follows:
N (I + g- gy
PV = I = N(X)
t = 1 (1 + d -d)'
where PV equals the present value of future damages, X. is the level of damages at the beginning and
N is the number of years over which damages will be incurred. Landsea & Roberts, supra note 3, at
109.
84. For more on the "wash" analysis, see Brody, supra note 9, at 1023 n.85.
85. A proponent of this approach acknowledges that it ignores the historical fact that the dis-
count rate exceeds the growth rate by 1%. Wolfgang W. Franz, Simplifying Future Lost Earnings,
TRIL, Aug. 1977 at 34, 36.
86. Note, Future Inflation, supra note 17, at 125.
87. The inaccuracies in this approach are due to the fact that it "arbitrarily changes the assump-
tions." Eck et al., supra note 67, at 30. As is obvious from the formula in supra note 83, this
approach removes the growth rate (g), the discount rate (d), and expected price inflation (i) from the
analysis.
88. The formula for this approach is as follows:
N X.(1 + g - g)' N X.
Pv= x = .
t=l (1 +d-i) t  t= (I +d-i)
where PV equals the present value of future damages, X is the level of damages at the beginning, g is
the expected annual damage growth rate, d is the annual discount rate, i is the expected rate of price
inflation, N is the number of years over which damages will be incurred and t is a variable which
goes to N and represents the compounding of g and d. Landsea & Roberts, supra note 3, at 112.
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arrive at the "Modified Feldman" nominal growth rate (k - g).19 These
approaches differ by a factor of g - i in the denominator of the equation.
The Feldman formulas are mathematically flawed since they ignore
the final component, i(gr) or i(kr), of the nominal rate formulas.90 These
approaches are judicial attempts to account for co-variancing between
the nominal rates and inflation by offsetting them. This calculation,
however, is not a simple algebraic process, and definitional problems91 at
the beginning of the analysis can cause large discrepancies. 92
The Average Annual Damage/Annualized Approach
The final approach that courts have used is the Average Annual
Damage/Annualized Approach.93 This approach is heavily flawed and
highly inaccurate94 due to its assumption that the timing of the payments
is not important.95 This is a serious flaw since the very purpose of these
present value calculations is to accurately reflect the time value of money
and replicate the plaintiff's actual losses as they accrue.
89. The formula for this approach is as follows:
N X,,(l + g - gt N X.
Pv= x = It --- I (I + d - gyt t = I (I + d - g)t
where PV equals the present value of future damages, X. is the level of damages at the beginning, g is
the expected annual damage growth rate, d is the annual discount rate, N is the number of years over
which damages will be incurred and t is a variable which goes to N and represents the compounding
of g and d. Landsea & Roberts, supra note 3, at 114.
90. Landsea & Roberts, supra note 3, at 111-12.
91. Anderson & Roberts, Economic Theory, supra note 53, at 736-37.
92. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text explaining multiplication and magnification of
small errors. There has been an attempt to arrive at a differential rate that is accurate over the long
term. Gary A. Anderson & David L. Roberts, Stability in the Present Value Determination of Future
Lost Earnings: An Historical Perspective with Implications for Predictability, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV.
847 (1985). The authors recommend a "benchmark after-tax differential discount rate of -0.5%."
lt at 871. The authors do not claim this will lead to perfect results, but claim it is "exceptionally
stable both over time and across different occupations." IK at 870.
93. The equation for this approach is as follows:
PV= N X O( + y
t = I N t = I (I + d)'
where PV equals the present value of future damages, X. is the level of damages at the beginning, g is
the expected annual damage growth rate, d is the annual discount rate, N is the number of years over
which damages will be incurred and t is a variable which goes to N and represents the compounding
of g and d. Landsea & Roberts, supra note 3, at 118.
94. See id. at 119.
95. Eck et al., supra note 67, at 30.
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Conclusion
The various approaches detailed above are confusing because of
their complexity, their difficulty of application and the different results
they produce given identical assumptions and inputs.96 Choosing one as
superior is thus made difficult. This author feels the Nominal Rates Ap-
proach is the best approach for judicial use in structuring award pay-
ments.97 It does not attempt to utilize the Fisher effect in the name of
simplicity. It allows for advocacy by both plaintiffs and defendants re-
garding the appropriate growth and discount rates. And it uses the more
familiar "nominal" or "market" rates, rather than "real" rates. There is
no dispute about its validity or technical accuracy.9
The Traditional/Penrod Approach is biased in favor of defendants
because it fails to incorporate any growth rate. The Alaska Approach is
technically flawed since it assumes the growth rate and the discount rate
are equal, thereby canceling each other out. Since the discount rate usu-
ally exceeds the growth rate, this approach is biased in the plaintiff's
favor. The Differential Rate Approaches inaccurately attempt to utilize
the Fisher effect. Differential rates should be avoided because in their
attempts to simplify, they accept and inaccurately apply a principle that
is not universally accepted. The Average Annual Damage/Annualized
Approach essentially "front-loads" the growth component by calculating
the stream of payments and then averaging it, thus resulting in a severe
bias in favor of the plaintiff.
96. The phenomenon by which the different approaches detailed above yield different results
despite identical inputs and assumptions is best demonstrated by example. Assume the following:
X0 = $50,000 g = 2.0%
d 8.5% i =5.0%
N =20




Feldman ("Real Interest Rate") 720,620
Modified Feldman (Net Discount) 550,925
Average Annual Damage 536,332
Source: LeRoy T. Watkins, F.S.A., F.C.A., Buffalo, NY.
97. This approach has support from at least six leading economists in this area. Eck et a. supra
note 67; Vincent M. Jolivet, Present Value of Future Earnings Revisited, 49 INS. CouNs. J. 316
(1982); Landsea & Roberts supra note 3.
98. Eck et al., supra note 67, at 30. It also has the support of the Supreme Court. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983).
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PART THREE
CPLR Article 5099 had its origins in the concern over the medical
malpractice insurance crisis, a concern which led to the enactment of
CPLR Article 50-A as part of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of
1985.100 This act had three purposes: (1) to increase the efficiency of the
medical malpractice litigation process by encouraging settlement and by
expediting such litigation through various pretrial procedures; (2) to
contain the liability of physicians and dentists within limits that maintain
a fair and full recovery for the plaintiff and limit contingent attorney's
fees by replacing the standard one-third arrangement with a sliding fee
scale; and (3) to reduce medical malpractice litigation.101 A year later,
as part of the Toxic Tort legislation, the legislature expanded Article 50
to cover actions for personal injury, property damage and wrongful
death."0 2 When word of the contemplated expansion of Article 50
reached the legal community, it was presumed that the legislature would
merely extend the scope of Article 50-A from malpractice actions to tort
actions in general.'03 Instead, the legislature enacted a separate article,
CPLR Article 50-B, 1' leading some to fear that there would be substan-
tial differences between the two.'0 5 Those fears were unfounded, since
Article 50-B is nearly identical to Article 50-A, differing only in the type
of action it covers.1"6 Because these differences do not have any effect on
the substantive issues, they will not be analyzed in this section. 10 7
99. The complete text of Article 50 appears in the Appendix.
100. Article 50-A includes §§ 5031-39 (codified at N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 5031-39 (McKin-
ney 1992)).
101. Memorandum of the State Executive Department, reprinted in 1985 N.Y. Laws 3019,
3022-27. (McKinney).
102. N.Y. Civ. PRAc L. & R. 5041 (McKinney 1992).
103. N.Y. Civ. PRA c L. & R. 5041 practice commentary (McKinney 1992).
104. Article 50-B, which includes §§ 5041-49 (codified at N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5041-49
(McKinney 1992)).
105. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5041 practice commentary (McKinney 1992).
106. The differences between Article 50-A and Article 50-B are flagged in the Appendix. Lan-
guage that differs is italicized in the text of Article 50-B and the language that replaces it in 50-A is
underlined.
107. The language of Article 50-A and 50-B differ only by the substitution in 50-B of the lan-
guage "personal injury, injury to property or wrongful death" for the Article 50-A language "dental,
medical or podiatric malpractice." The Articles are structured identically, with Article 50-A utiliz-
ing the section numbering convention 5031-5039, and Article 50-B utilizing 5041-5049. Section
5031 is identical to 5041, except for its coverage, and so forth. For the sake of convenience, refer-
ences to particular sections of Article 50 will be in the form "5031/41," reflecting the near identity
of the sections. References to Articles 50-A and 50-B in their entirety will be to "Article 50."
There are additional problems of greater importance that will also not be addressed in this article.
First, Article 50 seems to have been hastily enacted in that it is not well coordinated with other
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There is very little case law on Article 50, due in large part to its
complexity."'8 Cases that do proceed to trial and verdict often settle
statutes. There is a time gap between N.Y. Civ. PRoc. L. & R. 4111 (which requires an itemized
verdict without any regard to present value) and pre-1985 § 5031 and pre-1986 § 5041 cases. This
time gap is not a great problem though, since the cases which fall within the gap between the effec-
tive dates of the two sections will eventually go away. It has, however, created some controversy
about whether an amendment to synchronize the two sections would be ex post facto legislation.
Bohner, supra note 4, at 5; see Kelner & Kelner, supra note 4, at 6.
In addition, there was a problem with the language of EPTL § 5-4.3 which seems to say that in a
wrongful death action there shall be interest from the date of death on the "principal sum recov-
ered." N.Y. Esr. PowERs & TRusTs LAW § 5-4.3(a) (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1992). At least two
judges and the Appellate Division, First Department, have held that they have no choice but to
follow the express language of the statute and have required interest on the present value of future
damages. Jeras v. East Manufacturing Corp., 540 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658-59 (Sup. Ct. 1989); Schmertz v.
Matteo, 560 N.Y.S.2d 591, 592-93 (Sup. Ct. 1990), aff'd, 567 N.Y.S.2d 691 (App. Div. 1991), rev'd
sub nom., Milbrandt v. A.P. Green Refractories Co., 588 N.E.2d 45 (N.Y. 1992). Contra Shu-Tao
Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1984). The rulings in Jeras and
Schmertz did not seem to make any sense since future damages have never been held to be overdue,
and as such, subject to delay interest, until there has been an adjudication that damages are due.
Interpreted this way, EPTL § 5-4.3 thwarts the purpose of Article 50, which was intended to reduce
verdicts within fair limits.
The Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue in an opinion which reversed the First and
Fourth Departments of the Appellate Division. The court held that pre-verdict interest (interest
from the date of death to verdict) under EPTL § 5-4.3 should not be added to future losses, which
have not been discounted back to the date of death, or to past damages as a whole, but should be
added to each past loss separately from the date that each loss was incurred. Milbrandt v. A.P.
Green Refractories Co., 588 N.E.2d 45 (N.Y. 1992), rev'g 567 N.Y.S.2d 691 (App. Div. 1991), and
rev'g 562 N.Y.S.2d 252 (App. Div. 1990).
108. There are 22 reported cases which cite Article 50. These cases are: Merrill v. Albany
Medical Ctr., 512 N.Y.S.2d 519, 522 (App. Div. 1987) (noting that § 5031 would have applied if this
case had been commenced after the effective date for Article 50-A); Cabreaja v. New York City
Health and Hosps. Corp., 514 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (App. Div. 1987) (involving the interaction of N.Y.
GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-h and Article 50-A, where the plaintiff unsuccessfully alleged deliberate delay
on the part of the defendant); Lieberman v. Perez-Veridiano, 536 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (The
first case to address any of the specifics of Article 50, it mentions subdivisions (b) and (c) and the
mandatory nature of subdivision (e). In addition, it states that loss of enjoyment of life is identical
to, or subsumed under, the concept of pain and suffering and is thereby subject to the 10-year limit.);
Marte v. Monteflore Medical Ctr., 538 N.Y.S.2d 396, 398 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (discussing how Article
50-A has effect of encouraging plaintiffs to postpone trial, thereby increasing past damages); Ursini
v. Sussman, 541 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (the first case to attempt subdivision (e) calculations
and address the circularity of subdivisions (c) and (e)); Jeras v. East Manufacturing Corp., 540
N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (discussing the interaction of the effective dates of N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. L. & R. 4111() and Article 50-B which creates a "hybrid situation" in wrongful death cases
commenced after August 1, 1988 where the jury makes its award of future damages without reduc-
tion to present value and the court is not instructed to reduce future damages to present value);
Andrulonis v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 1421, 1519-20 n.616 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing Article 50 in
"but see" form relating to conservative investments); Alisandrelli v. Kenwood, 724 F. Supp. 235
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying Article 50 in federal court diversity cases); In re Estate of Kritzer, 553
N.Y.S.2d 968, 969-70 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (Article 50 used by analogy for statutory construction); Esco-
bar v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 566 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (discussing the problem of the effective
dates of N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4111(0 and Article 50); Schmertz v. Matteo, 560 N.Y.S.2d 591
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soon after a verdict is rendered, rather than proceed to the complex and
costly process of entering judgment under the statute."° Judges often
encourage settlement rather than wrestle with the statute and all of its
difficulties. Due to this dearth of case law much of the analysis that fol-
lows is the opinion of the author. Discussion and criticism of the analy-
sis, suggestions and conclusions are encouraged.
The heart of Article 50 is section 5031/41, which creates a multiple
(Sup. Ct. 1990) (referencing problem with N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4111(f) and Article 50-B and
addressing a similar problem in interaction of N.Y. CIrv. PRAc. L & R. 4111(f) and N.Y. EsT.
PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3 relating to pre-verdict interest in wrongful death cases); Frey v.
Chester E. Smith & Sons, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (the first case to apply subdivi-
sion (a) to a verdict; also computes present value despite circularity of subdivisions (c) and (e));
Hudson v. Manhattan & Bronx Trans. Auth., 568 N.Y.S.2d 503, 504, 505 (Sup. CL 1990) (address-
ing gap in the effective dates of N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & K. 411 l(d) and Article 50 and dealing with the
problem as an excessive verdict); Milano v. Freed, 767 F. Supp. 450, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (referenc-
ing Article 50 and the holding in A1isandrelli in a dispute over pleading damages in federal court
medical malpractice cases); In re E. and S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1410 (E.D.N.Y.
and S.D.N.Y. 1991) (appropriate discount rate is 6.88% based on one-year Treasury Bills);
Gambardelli v. Allstate Overhead Garage Doors, Inc., 576 N.Y.S.2d 770, 774 (1991) (holding that
4% increase in the annual payment under § 5041(e) has no impact on inflation testimony); In re
New York City Asbestos Litig., 572 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1010 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (one sentence mention of
the requirements of § 5041); Hill v. Muchow, 579 N.Y.S.2d 254, 255 (App. Div. 1991) (defendant
does not waive application of Article 50 by failing to submit proof of a discount rate, since the
statute "unequivocally places the onus on the court to structure the judgment"); Stiles v. Batavia
Atomic Horseshoes, Inc., 579 N.Y.S.2d 790, 794 (1992) (failure to itemize a verdict pursuant to
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & K. 4111 harmless error since § 5041(e) did not apply and since plaintiff's
expert reduced future damages to present value); Reed v. Harter Chair Corp., 586 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404
(Sup. Ct. 1992) (stating that it was error for trial court to not "structure an annuity contract for a
part of the award for future damages"); Rohring v. City of Niagara Falls, 584 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup.
Ct. 1992) (addressing the circularity of subdivisions (c) and (e), but not computing two present
values); Peterson v. Zuercher, 584 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (explicitly describing steps taken to
calculate attorney's fees and present value, stating that the 4% represents inflation and that Article
50 is to be applied separately to verdicts in derivative causes of actions). Hill v. Muchow, No. H-
84795 (Sup. CL Erie County Sept. 11, 1992) (setting forth subdivision (c) and (e) calculations and
stating that inflation, step increases, productivity, real rate of growth and promotions are included in
the statutory 4%) will likely be reported shortly.
109. In Rohring v. City of Niagara Falls, 584 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. CL 1992), judgment was
entered more than one year after the verdict was rendered. The February 14, 1991 verdict totaled
$2,501,311.00. Id at 513. A hearing for Article 50 purposes was held July 30, 1991. Id The court
did not enter judgment for the present value of the annuity contract, but for an annuity contract to
provide certain payments. Id at 516. Assuming a discount rate of 7.5% and applying the statutory
4%, this author calculated the present value of the required annuity to be $997,324.28. The total
lump sum portion of the judgment was $949,637.27. Id Thus the total judgment was
$1,946,961.55. The plaintiff was awarded interest. Id. The CPLR provides for 9% interest from the
date of verdict to the date of entry of final judgment. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & KL 5002, 5004 (McKin-
ney 1992). Interest earned in one year on the $1.9 million plus award amounts to more than
$175,000. This provides a strong incentive to settle. At least one defendant has attempted to halt
this accrual of interest by tendering payment to the clerk pursuant to N.Y. Civ. PROC. L. & R.
5021(a) (McKinney 1992). Hill v. Muchow, No. H-84795 (Sup. Ct. Erie County Sept. 11, 1992).
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step process by which courts are to enter judgment for damage awards
under the statute. This process, while relatively simple and straightfor-
ward at first glance, is in practice confusing and difficult to apply. The
statute directs a court to make a variety of adjustments to the jury's, or
its own, damage verdicts, and to reduce portions of those verdicts to
present value, but it does not provide crucial guidance regarding whether
certain of these adjustments are to be made before or after the reduction
to present value. Nor does the statute provide adequate guidance to
courts regarding the proper derivation of interest and growth rates to be
used in the present value calculations. Such ambiguity and confusion
have undoubtedly led courts and parties to avoid the application of the
statute by encouraging and accepting lump sum settlements on more eas-
ily understandable terms.
Subdivisions (a), (c) and (e) of § 5031/41 present the greatest com-
plexity and the most interesting problems associated with § 5031/41.
Subdivision (a) contains a direction to courts that damages be adjusted to
reflect set-offs, credits, and other adjustments other than reduction to
present value. Subdivision (c) relates to litigation expenses and attor-
ney's fees. Subdivision (e) requires that future damages in excess of
$250,000 be reduced to present value.
Subdivisions (b), (d) and (f) are not particularly problematic and
will only be discussed in passing. Subdivision (b) instructs the court to
calculate the portions of the judgment that remain payable in lump sum
form, such as past damages and future damages up to $250,000, and to
enter judgment upon these amounts.110 Subdivision (d) provides for re-
imbursement to subrogees and lien holders. 1  Subdivision (f) allows the
110. This direction applies to all past damages, future damages not in excess of $250,000, and
fees and costs pursuant to subdivisions (c) and (d). The $250,000 lump sum that is a portion of
future damages shall be deducted from each item of future damages in the same proportion as that
item of future damages bears to total future damages. For example, assume a jury awards $200,000
future lost wages, $300,000 future medical costs and $500,000 future pain and suffering. The
$250,000 lump sum that is due from the total future award should then be deducted from the above
three categories in the following manner: 20% from lost wages (200,000/1,000,000 x 100); 30%
from medical costs (300,000/1,000,000 x 100); and 50% from pain and suffering (500,000/1,000,000
x 100).
111. Subdivision (d) relates to the right of subrogees and lien holders to recover, in lump sum
form, payments they have made that have now been recovered by the plaintiff. Subdivision (e) states
that these adjustments should be made before reduction to present value. As suggested in the discus-
sion of subdivision (a), infra text accompanying notes 113-15 and 120, the timing of any adjustments
in relation to subdivision (e) computations should hinge on the nature of the adjustment. If the
adjustment is a gross amount, it should be made before the subdivision (e) calculations are per-
formed; if the adjustments are themselves reduced, they should be made after the calculations under
subdivision (e). It is a problem of treating like numbers alike.
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parties to waive the provisions of the entire Article.
1 12
Sections 5031/41
Subdivision (a) of § 5031/41 directs the court to make adjustments
to the findings of the trier of fact for setoffs, credits, comparative negli-
gence,113 additurs and remittiturs. This direction is not as explicit as it
seems, however, given that: (1) the statute is not clear as to whether
these adjustments are to be made before or after the award is reduced to
present value pursuant to subdivision (e) and (2) it is not clear whether
these adjustments are the type of adjustments that are within the in-
tended meaning of subdivision (e), but which are not expressly men-
tioned therein.' 14 These two problems are actually so interrelated as to
be one. Whether these are adjustments within the scope of subdivision
(e) flows from a determination of whether they are adjustments that pre-
cede or follow the reduction to present value.
If the subdivision (a) adjustment is itself a discounted amount, it is
an adjustment that is more properly made after the subdivision (e) pres-
ent value computations are made.1 5 In contrast, remittitur is a function
112. Waiver of the provisions of the Article requires the consent of the plaintiff (now claimant)
and any or all of the defendants (now parties liable). N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5041(f) (McKinney
1992). Since waiver is allowed, the statute is not truly mandatory. But since mutual consent is
required, the statute is not truly elective, either. In Hill v. Muchow, the Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, held that a defendant does not waive the application of Article 50 by failing to submit
proof ofa discount rate, since the statute places the onus on the court. 579 N.Y.S.2d 254,255 (App.
Div. 1991).
113. At first blush, it appears that the plaintiff's comparative negligence could be deducted
either before or after the reduction to present value. However, this might not be the case since
comparative negligence is expressed as a percentage of total fault. The lump sums that are due up
front may alter the calculation so that a 10% deduction from the gross verdict is not equivalent to a
10% deduction from the total lump sums due, together with the present value of the periodic
payments.
114. Although this was not at issue in Ursini (one of the earliest and most thorough cases apply-
ing Article 50), Judge Gammerman stated in dicta that these "adjustments" should be made before
the reduction to present value. Ursini v. Sussman, 541 N.Y.S.2d 916, 919 (Sup. Ct. 1989). This
decision to make the subdivision (a) adjustments before reduction to present value fits with the
requirement that amounts to be paid to subrogees and lien holders under § 5031/41(d) be deducted
prior to the reduction to present value under § 5031/41(e).
115. This arguably would be the case when the plaintiff and a co-defendant have settled in the
shadow of Article 50, that co-defendant is ultimately found partially liable and a non-settling joint
tortfeasor is seeking the benefit of N.Y. GEN. OBLiG. LAW § 15-108. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-
108 gives a non-settling defendant who is faced with a verdict against him, credit for the larger of:
(1) the jury-assessed percentage of liability of the settling defendant or (2) the dollar value of the
settlement. The issue arises as to whether this is to be done before Article 50 is applied, after it has
been applied or whenever it is most beneficial to the non-settling defendant. CPLR § 5031/41(a)
would seem to require that credit pursuant to N.Y. GEN. OBLG. LAW § 15-108 be done first, as it is
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of "excessiveness," which is measured by the amount of the gross verdict
and as such is more appropriately an adjustment that should be made
before the subdivision (e) computations are made.
Subdivision (c) presents its own set of difficulties. Subdivision (c)
directs the payment of litigation expenses and attorney's fees in a lump
sum comprised of three different amounts: (1) expenses and fees related
to past damages; (2) attorney's fees related to the first $250,000 of future
damages; and (3) attorney's fees related to the present value of future
damages greater than $250,000. While the first two components of this
expense and fee amount are easily determinable, the third component is
not because of the complexity of its interaction with subdivision (e) and
the resulting problem of "circularity."116
This problem of circularity stems from the cross-referential lan-
guage of subdivisions (c) and (e). Subdivision (c) requires that the third
component of the expense and fee award be based on the present value of
a portion of future damages, with that present value calculated pursuant
to subdivision (e). Subdivision (e), however, requires that adjustments
pursuant to subdivisions (b), (c) and (d) be made prior to reduction of the
remaining amount to present value. Thus, it is not clear whether the
subdivision (c) calculation or the subdivision (e) calculation is to be per-
formed first, or even whether this particular subdivision (c) calculation is
one contemplated by subdivision (e). Despite this ambiguity, it seems
that this subdivision (c) adjustment is one more properly made after the
subdivision (e) reduction to present value is made, given that the amount
is based on present value and that the statute does not facilitate a clearer
reading of the proper sequence in which the calculations are to be
made. 117
Subdivision (e) presents the thorniest problems associated with Arti-
an "applicable rule of law." The policy and rationale of GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 would seem to
require that credit be given in the manner that is most beneficial to the non.settlor, since the plaintiff
bears the burden of a bad settlement.
116. In Ursini, Judge Gammerman was confronted with this circularity and chose to attempt to
address it by first calculating a "dummy" present value under subdivision (e), calculating the attor-
ney's fee based on this number, subtracting the attorney's fee (which is a percentage of a present
value) from the remaining gross future damages, and then "recalculating" the present value under
subdivision (e). 541 N.Y.S.2d, 916, 919-20 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
117. There is an alternative reading of subdivision (c) which would remove the circularity. Sub-
division (c) reads, in part, as follows: "Payment of that portion of the attorney's fees related to the
future periodically paid damages shall also be payable in a lump sum, based on the present value of
the annuity contract purchased to provide payment of such future periodically paid damages pursu-
ant to subdivision (e) of this section." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & L 5041(c) (McKinney 1992) (emphasis
added). If the phrase "pursuant to" is read as modifying the more adjacent verb "purchased" rather
than the more distant verb "based," the mathematical circularity is removed.
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cle 50. It is this section that provides for the conversion of future dam-
ages into a present value upon which judgment is entered. Subdivision
(e) directs courts to enter judgment for the present value of future dam-
ages over $250,000, to be calculated after adjustments prescribed by sub-
divisions (b), (c) and (d) have been made and in accordance with
"generally accepted actuarial practices."11 It further directs courts to
increase the annual payments at a rate of 4%.19 These directions cause
four major problems: (1) the meaning of "adjustment" is not defined and
it is not clear which adjustments pursuant to subdivisions (b), (c) and (d)
should be made before the subdivision (e) calculations are performed and
which should be made after; (2) the directions contribute to the circular-
ity problem of subdivisions (c) and (e); (3) the directions do not define
what is meant by the term "generally accepted actuarial practices" nor
make clear whether this term implicates a particular discounting method
or discount rate; and (4) the directions do not make clear the purpose of
the 4% rate mandated for use in increasing the annual payments.
(1) Adjustments. In applying § 5031/41, the adjustments of subdi-
visions (a), (b), (c) and (d) should be timed in relation to the subdivision
(e) calculations by the nature of the adjustment. If an adjustment is itself
an amount that has been reduced to present value, it should be made
after the subdivision (e) calculations are made. If a subdivision (a), (b),
(c) or (d) adjustment is a gross or unreduced amount, the adjustment
should be made before the subdivision (e) calculations. Adjustments
should only be made when the amounts are in the same reduced or un-
reduced state.
120
118. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & RL 5031/41(e) (McKinney 1992).
119. Id.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 113-15 for a discussion of subdivision (a). Frey v.
Chester R Smith & Sons, Inc. is the only Article 50 case which applies subdivision (a) to a verdict.
751 F. Supp. 1052, 1054-56 (1990). The Frey court made adjustments for the plaintiff's comparative
negligence, prior settlement and social security as a collateral source. I. All of these adjustments
were made prior to the reduction to present value, in accordance with a literal reading of subdivi-
sions (a) and (e). The prior settlement was worth a total value of $525,690 ($200,000 cash, plus
$300,000 to purchase an annuity, plus $25,690 representing two-thirds of a waiver of the worker's
compensation lien). Id at 1054-55. The $300,000 award to purchase an annuity is clearly a present
value, and the statute should allow for its deduction after the subdivision (e) calculations are per-
formed. In all likelihood, the worker's compensation lien was in part attributable to a lump sum
payment of the present value of future damages, as determined by the worker's compensation sched-
ules, and should be made after the subdivision (e) calculations. The statute should be capable of
differentiating between reduced and unreduced (goss) adjustments.
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(2) Circularity. Two premier cases applying subdivision (e), Ursini
v. Sussman t and Frey v. Chester E. Smith & Sons, Inc., 12 differ in their
approach to handling the circularity problem of subdivisions (c) and (e)
and in the choice of the method for reduction to present value. Ursini
attempted to apply the statute literally - computing two present values,
one before the attorney fee computation and one after the attorney fee
deduction. 2 In addition to the complexity of the calculations this circu-
larity creates,"2 it also leads to mathematical errors.1 25 Frey, by ignoring
the circularity problem, seems to have adopted the better, and simpler,
approach. 126
Frey avoids both of the mathematical errors of Ursini by utilizing
the Nominal Rates Approach and by ignoring circularity. After reduc-
ing the future damage award to present value and determining the
amount of future periodic installment payments, the Frey court simply
calculated one third of each of the installment payments in accordance
with the contingency payment agreement reached between the plaintiff
and the attorney. The court then summed these amounts over the pay-
ment term and entered judgment on the sum as the future damages por-
tion of the attorney's fee. 27 This approach is both simple and
economically sound.
121. 541 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
122. 751 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). The case of Alisandrelli v. Kenwood, 724 F. Supp.
235, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), stated that the New York statute must apply in diversity actions since it
substantially affects a state right and to do otherwise would invite forum shopping and subvert the
state interest which led to the enactment of the statute.
123. 541 N.Y.S.2d at 919. Other cases have taken the same or a similar position. See Rohring
v. City of Niagara Falls, 584 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. 1992); Peterson v. Zuercher, 584 N.Y.S.2d 968
(Sup. Ct. 1992); Hill v. Muchow, No. H-84795 (Sup. Ct. Erie County Sept. 11, 1992).
124. See ag., Ursini, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
125. This approach requires that an annual deduction for each item of future damages be com-
puted by dividing the total of each (after reduction for the proportion of the $250,000 lump sum) by
its term. This annual deduction can then be inflated at 4% over the term. These figures are next
reduced to present value. The attorney fee on the present value is subsequently deducted in the
proper proportion to arrive at the new annual deduction (this can be done by subtracting the total
proportion from the total of each item or by dividing the proportion by the term and then sub-
tracting the result from the original annual deduction). This new annual deduction is inflated at 4%,
and finally the present value is recalculated on a new stream of annual amounts. This recalculation
of the present value actually increases the present value of the original jury award as can be seen
when comparing the second present value added to the attorney fees portion of the first present value
with the first present value.
126. There is support for the proposition that courts should avoid a literal interpretation of a
statute when such an interpretation would produce an absurd or unjust result. See Milbrandt v. A.P.
Green Refractories Co., 588 N.E.2d 45, 49 (N.Y. 1992). Apparently, Frey thought this circularity
produced an absurd or unjust result.
127. See appendices to Frey. 751 F. Supp 1052, 1058-60 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
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(3) "Generally Accepted Actuarial Practices. " The term "generally
accepted actuarial practices" seems to implicate the Nominal Rates Ap-
proach, since only this approach (1) avoids the controversial aspects of
the Fisher effect; (2) allows for advocacy in terms which are familiar to
the judge, the jury and the attorneys involved in the case; and (3) is tech-
nically sound. The approach to be implemented is not clear from the
statute, however, so the word "nominal" should be placed in front of any
rate cited in the statute as a means of alleviating confusion.
128
The Nominal Rates Approach, adopted by Judge McAvoy in
Frey,129 is the only approach that has been explicitly adopted in a case
applying Article 50. It is unclear from Judge Gammerman's decision in
Ursini 13 0 which approach was used in that case.
(4) Purpose of the 4% Rate The adoption of a 4% escalation fig-
ure is one of the most perplexing aspects of the statute. It is not based on
any of the approaches discussed in Part Two, nor is its purpose revealed
in the legislative history. If it is intended to represent inflation or the rate
of growth, 31 its adoption runs contrary to the widely accepted premise
that the nominal growth rate and the nominal discount rate are interde-
pendent. 32 If it is not intended to represent inflation or growth, 33 but is
instead compensation 34 to the plaintiff for receiving the judgment over
time instead of as a lump sum, it runs contrary to Article 50's purpose of
128. The courts which have applied Article 50 and which discuss the discount rate have used
rates which range from 6.88% to 8.00%. See Ursini, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 916 (applying a discount rate
of 7.5% based on the testimony of nine economists in prior cases); Frey, 751 F. Supp. at 1057 (using
the 7.0% interest rate the Federal Reserve charges banks); In re E. and S. Asbes. Litig., 772 F. Supp.
1380, 1410 (E.D.N.Y. and S.D.N.Y. 1991) (choosing 6.88% based on the rate of one year Treasury
Bills); Rohring v. City of Niagara Falls, 584 N.Y.S.2d 513, 515 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (choosing 7.5%
based on the testimony of the economists referenced in Ursini and the prevailing market situation);
Peterson v. Zuercher, 584 N.Y.S.2d 968, 971-72 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (applying an 8% discount rate based
on the testimony of the defendant's economist which was supported by the Treasury Department's
long-term rate of 8% or 8.3% depending on the compounding period); Hill v. Muchow, No. H-
84795, slip op. at 2 (Sup. Ct. Erie County Sept. 11, 1992) (choosing 7.0% as the discount rate since it
was the "Federal Reserve discount rate").
129. 751 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
130. 541 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
131. See Peterson v. Zuercher, 584 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Sup. Ct. 1992); Hill v. Muchow, No. H-84795
(Sup. Ct. Erie County Sept. 11, 1992). This is one possibility discussed by Judge Ira Gammerman in
his article, CPLR Articles 50-A and 50-B: Unresolved Questions, N.Y. ST. B.A. TRIuL LAW. SEC.
DIG., June 1991, at 10, 11. See also Kelner & Kelner, supra note 4, at 3.
132. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
133. See Gambardelli v. Allstate Overhead Garage Doors, Inc., 576 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Sup. Ct.
1991).
134. Gammerman, supra note 131, at 11; see also Kelner & Keiner, supra note 4.
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containing liability.1 35
The 4% rate is not supported by any theoretical or practical basis
and should be eliminated from the statute. The words "nominal inflation
rate ... determined by the trier of fact" should be substituted. This
solution would be technically accurate and would allow greater advocacy
and flexibility in the determination of the appropriate rates, since differ-
ent components of the award may increase at different rates depending
on external macroeconomic factors. This would also clarify whether tes-
timony should be allowed regarding the rate of inflation.
1 36
These problems have led one judge to comment that "the complex-
ity of the statute is exceeded only by the complexity of its application."
137
This complexity is evidenced by Judge Gammerman's decision in Ursini,
and by the paucity of cases applying the statute at the trial level or re-
viewing the application of the statute at the appellate level. This com-
plexity intimidates attorneys from pursuing a judgment under the
statute, encouraging them instead to settle after a verdict has been ren-
dered. The statute is clearly having an effect upon the payment of judg-
ments, albeit not the intended one.
Sections 5032-39/42-49
The remaining sections (§§ 5032-39/42-49) of Article 50 present
problems, largely beyond the scope of this article, that are of lesser im-
portance than the problems of § 5031/41. Sections 5032-36/42-46 of the
statute provide security for the plaintiff by mandating the purchase of
annuity contracts from qualified insurers, by requiring the posting of ade-
quate security, by providing for payment of the structured award to the
plaintiff's estate in event of his death and by allowing payment of a lump
sum to the plaintiff in event of his financial hardship. Sections 5032/
42138 and 5033/43139 expand upon the posting of security first mentioned
135. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
136. See Kelner & Kelner, supra note 4, for a discussion of both sides of the inflation testimony
issue. Gambardelli v. Allstate Overhead Garage Doors decided that inflation testimony was allowed
since Article 50 (providing for the 4%) only has post-verdict applicability and CPLR § 4111 con-
trols the verdict to be rendered by the jury. 576 N.Y.S.2d 770, 770 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
137. Justice Joseph S. Levine coined this phrase. Lieberman v. Perez-Verdiano, 536 N.Y.S.2d
388, 389 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
138. Section 5032/42 states that security "must be in the form of an annuity contract, executed
by a qualified insurer and approved by the superintendent of insurance." This language implies that
the superintendent must approve each annuity contract. Given the reference to § 5039/49, it is more
likely that this section was intended to require the superintendent to approve each qualified insurer
who executes an annuity contract and was not meant to require the superintendent to approve annu-
ity contracts.
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in § 5031/41(e). Some ambiguities and circularities exist in these sec-
tions, but their most important implication is the potential for unfavora-
ble tax treatment. 140 Section 5037/47 explicitly provides that the statute
does not limit the parties' rights to settle their dispute in any manner
they consider appropriate. Section 5038/48 provides for a limited right
of assignment of periodic installments. 141 Finally, under § 5039/49 the
139. Section 5033/43(c) relates to the failure of a party (who is the only party liable for a
portion of the judgment) to post security in the form of an annuity contract. It refers to the right of
the claimant to a lump sum. Section 5034/44 reveals some of the cross-referencing problems of
Article 50. The last two subdivisions of § 5034/44 contain instructions for accelerating the remain-
ing periodic payments in the event a periodic payment is not timely made. The court is instructed to
total the remaining periodic payments "as calculated pursuant to subdivision (b)" without con-
verting payments to present value. The reference to subdivision (b) of § 5031/41 is misplaced. Sub-
division (b) refers to entering judgment for the lump sums. It is subdivision (e) that contains the
bulk of the instructions for calculating the periodic payments.
140. Internal Revenue Code § 130 gives to the recipient of an annuity rights that are superior to
those of a general creditor of the assignee (usually a life insurance company). There is some disa-
greement over whether I.R.C. § 130 applies to judgments under Article 50. This disagreement
seems to relate to the use of the word "agreeing" in I.R.C. § 130(a). Since Article 50 is neither
mandatory nor elective and since there are benefits associated with compliance with I.R.C. § 130,
the most cautious approach may be to ensure that the terms of the judgment comply with the seven
requirements of I.R.C. § 130(c). These seven requirements are spelled out in detail in the materials
compiled by the New York State Bar Association for a seminar on Article 50. Scott H. Novak, Tax
Aspects of Structured Settlements, in STRUCTURED SETLEMENTS AND PERIODIC JUDGMENTS
UNDER CPLR ARnCLas 50-A AND 50-B - DURING THE NINETiES AND BEYOND 15 (N.Y. State
Bar Ass'n ed. 1991).
If I.R.C. § 130 does apply, these sections may not comply with its requirements since:
(1) Sections 5032/42 and 5033/43 do not provide defendant with a novation after security has
been posted;
(2) Section 5034/44 allows the plaintiff to petition to receive the total payout with interest if there
is a default. The judge then must accelerate the payments. S/he has no discretion to fashion the
remedy s/he feels appropriate. There also may be an issue as to whether acceleration of the total
payout and interest on the outstanding amount constitutes an acceptable disincentive (deterrent) or
an excessive penalty.
(3) Section 5035/45 may raise constructive receipt/acceleration issues as well as assignment is-
sues by allowing as payment to dependents or the estate those portions of the periodic payments
which are for future lost wages in the event of the judgment creditor's death; and
(4) Section 5036/46 allows for acceleration of the periodic payments if the plaintiff can show
hardship, thus raising constructive receipt problems again. The judge must make four factual find-
ings before s/he may order a lump sum of future payments not yet due. One of these findings is that
the need was unanticipated. This should be interpreted to mean that the jury did not and could not
anticipate this expense. Otherwise, a plaintiff under Article 50 would have a right to return to court
for expenses the jury may have considered and decided upon. Another finding is that the adjustment
will not impose a hardship on the judgment debtor(s). The potential hardship to the annuity com-
pany should also be a consideration.
141. The three permissible assignment purposes are: (1) alimony, maintenance or child support
obligations of the judgment creditor, (2) health care costs; and (3) attorney's fees and costs "in-
curred in securing the judgment." N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 5038, 5048 (McKinney 1992). The last
provision seems to be anomalous. The plaintiff typically has an agreement with his attorney to
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Superintendent of Insurance is assigned the duty of promulgating and
implementing new rules to determine which insurers are qualified to fund
judgments under the Article.142
PART FOUR
The author proposes for the sake of simplicity and uniformity that
Articles 50-A and 50-B be merged into a single Article 50 and that a
number of revisions be made to correct the problems discussed in Part
Three. The text of Article 50-B is set forth below, with the author's sug-
gested changes highlighted. Proposed deletions are struck out (e.g., de-
leted). Proposed additions are underlined (e.g., adde . The rationale
for each proposed revision is set forth following the text of the proposal.
§ 5041. Basis for determining judgment to be entered
In order to determine what judgment is to be entered on a verdict in an
action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property or wrong-
ful death under this article, d not subcot to, article fft--A of this chapter,
the court shall proceed as follows:
Rationale: This alteration integrates the two sections into one section.
(a) The court shall apply:
( to the findings of past and- fture damages any applicable rules
of law, including set-offs, credits, comparative negligence pursuant to sec-
tion fourteen hundred eleven of this chapter, additurs, and remittiturs, in
calculating the respective amounts of past and-future damages claimants
are entitled to recover and defendants are obligated to pay- and
(ii) to the findings of future damages any applicable rules of law,
including set-offs, credits, comparative negligence pursuant to section four-
teen hundred eleven of this chapter, additurs, and remittiturs, in calculating
the respective amounts of future damages claimants are entitled to recover
and defendants are obligated to pay. Any applicable rules of law which the
court finds more proper as adjustments after the reduction to present value
shall be applied after the present value computations under subdivision (e)
are performed.
Rationale: These changes separate adjustments made pursuant to subdi-
vision (a) into two classes: those to be made before the subdivision (e)
present value calculation and those to be made after said subdivision (e)
handle the case for a contingent fee. Since "the case" includes entering judgment under Article 50,
the fees associated with entering judgment have already been provided for in § 5031/41(c).
142. The duties require the superintendent to formulate rules and procedures to determine
which insurers are qualified to fund judgments under this Article. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. 5039,
5049 (McKinney 1992).
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calculation.143
(b) The court shall enter judgment in lump sum for past damages, for
future damages not in excess of two hundred fifty thousand dollars, and for
any damages, fees or costs payable in lump sum or otherwise under subdivi-
sions (c) and (d) of this section. For the purposes of this section, any lump
sum payment of a portion of future damages shall be deemed to include the
elements of future damages in the same proportion as such elements com-
prise of the total award for future damages as determined by the trier of
fact.
(c) Paymen -k,_itigation expenses and that pe n-ortin attorney's
fees relat.e to past daag. s shall be payable in a lump sum. PaMent-e
that port4i. of the a k ', fcstt y related to fitir da.ntgc for wheht, pUr-
sua•t to tis- articl, the -la--t is ,titd & 2oa hup 1 pa...t hal
also be payable in a lu.p --su. Pa mt of that portion of-tThe attorney's
fees related to the future periodically paid damages shall so-bepaab-
a-Imp-sm, be based on the present value of the annuity contract
purehased to provie pamn of sueh future perioffiall paid darnaMc as
computed pursuant to subdivision (e) of this section.
Rationale: These changes eliminate the redundancy of this subdivision
by stating in one sentence what was previously stated in three sentences.
In addition, these changes contribute to the elimination of the circularity
problem of subdivisions (c) and (e).
(d) Upon election of a subrogee or a lien holder, including an em-
ployer or insurer who provides workers' compensation, filed within the time
permitted by rule of court, any part of future damages allocable to reim-
bursement of payments previously made by the subrogee or the lien holder
shall be paid in lump sum to the subrogee or the lien holder in such amount
as is calculable and determinable under the law in effect at the time of such
payment. Such lump sum shall be deducted after the present value compu-
tations pursuant to subdivision (e) and before entering judgment for the
present value of an annuity contract pursuant to subdivision (e).
Rationale: Since prior payments that compensate for future losses are
likely already reduced to present value by the stage that this adjustment
is specified, this subdivision should be amended to specify adjustment
after subdivision (e) adjustments have been made.'"
(e) With respect to awards of future damages in excess of two hundred
fifty thousand dollars in an action to recover damages for personal injury,
injury to property or wrongful death, the court shall enter judgment as
follows:
143. See supra notes 113-15 and 120 and accompanying text for the discussion relating to subdi-
vision (a) adjustments.
144. See generally supra notes 113-15 and 120 and accompanying text for the discussion of the
timing of the subdivision (a), (b), (c) and (d) adjustments.
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Rationale: This non-apparent alteration continues the integration of the
two Articles by including malpractice actions within the reference to per-
sonal injury.
After making any adjustment prescribed by subdivisions (a)(,) (c),
and-(d) of this section, the court shall enter a judgment for the amount of
the present value of an annuity contract that will provide for the payment
of the remaining amounts of future damages in periodic installments less
any adjustments prescribed by subdivisions (a)(Hi), (c) or (d). The court, as
part of its judgment, shall direct that the defendants and their insurance
carriers shall be required to offer and to guarantee the purchase and pay-
ment of such an annuity contract. Such annuity contract shall provide for
the payment of the annual payments of such remaining future damages, less
any adjustments prescribed by subdivisions (a)(ii), (c) or (d), over the pe-
riod of time determined pursuant to this subdivision. The present value of
such contraet future damages shall be determined in accordance with gen-
erally accepted actuarial practices by applying the nominal discount rate in
effect at the time of the award to the full amount of the remaining future
damages, as calculated pursuant to this subdivision. The period of time
over which such periodic payments shall be made and the period of time
used to calculate the present value of th. aa ity cntlact such future dam-
aS shall be the period of years determined by the trier of fact in arriving-at
the itemized verdict; provided, however, that the period of time over which
such periodic payments shall be made and the period of time used to calcu-
late the present value for damages attributable to pain and suffering shall be
ten years or the period of time determined by the trier of fact whichever is
less. Th. eourt, as 1pat of its judg et, shal diet that the Jce miants mid
thei ...... .. .L--" shal be rquired to off.. mid to guarantee the
purehase =nd pamnto sueh an mmuity contract. Such a~t cotract
shaH provde for the payment of thea. payMents of-such rm -n
future. damages ever. the period of time de.term~±ined pursuant to this sttbd
sion. The inflation rate for each item of damages shall be the nominal infla-
tion rate for the corresponding item of damages as determined by the trier
of fact in the itemized verdict."' The annual payment for the first year
shall be calculated by dividing the remaining amount of future damages by
the number of years over which such payments shall be made and the pay-
ment due in each succeeding year shall be computed by adding four-percent
to the previous year's payment the product of the previous year's payment
and the nominal inflation rate applicable to that item of damages as deter-
mined by the trier of fact. The remaining present values shall then be to-
taled, adjustments prescribed by subdivisions (a)(Hi), (c) and (d) shall be
made, and the court shall enter judgment for the remainder. Where pay-
145. CPLR § 4111 will have to be amended so that the jury will indicate the inflation rate it
determines to be appropriate for each item. The author suggests that the penultimate sentence of
subdivisions (d) and (f) of § 4111 be amended as follows: "In itemizing amounts intended to com-
pensate for future damages, the jury shall set forth the period of years over which such amounts are
intended to provide compensation and the inflation rate at which such amounts are expected to grow."
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ment of a portion of the future damages terminates in accordance with the
provisions of this article, the four-percent nominal inflation rate added pay-
ment shall be based only upon that portion of the damages that remains
subject to continued payment. Unless otherwise agreed, the annual sum so
arrived at shall be paid in equal monthly installments and in advance.
Rationale: The changes to the first sentence allow for the classification of
the adjustments into adjustments to be made before the subdivision (e)
calculations and those to be made thereafter. 1" The second and third
sentences have merely been moved from their prior location, from which
they have been stricken, for the sake of enhanced comprehension. Minor
changes have been made. The change from "annuity contract" to "fu-
ture damages" or "damages" is suggested for the sake of clarity. The
addition of the term "nominal" and the deletion of the "4%" rate is
suggested to make it clear that the Nominal Rates/Frey Approach is to
be used. 147 The direction of a factual finding of the appropriate nominal
inflation rate allows for advocacy and flexibility. The changes in the sen-
tence beginning "The remaining present values shall then be totaled..."
eliminate the circularity of subdivisions (c) and (e), enacting the Frey
method of deducting attorney's fees from the award.
148
(f) With the consent of the claimant and any party liable, in whole or
in part, for the judgment, the court shall enter judgment for the amount
found for future damages attributable to said party as such are determina-
ble without regard to the provisions of this article.
§ 5042. Form of security
Security authorized or required for payment of a judgment for periodic
installments entered in accordance with this article must be in the form of
an annuity contract, executed by a qualified insurer, and approved by the
superintendent of insurance pursuant to section five thousand forty-nine of
this article, and approved by the court.
Rationale: This change eliminates an ambiguous reference by making it
clear that the Superintendent of Insurance is to approve insurers, not
annuity contracts.' 49 The second change continues the integration of the
two Articles.
146. See supra notes 113-15 and 120 and accompanying text. The reference to subdivision (b)
has been deleted from this sentence in its entirety since subdivision (b) is an instruction for entering
judgment and is not an "adjustment" section. The introductory paragraph to subdivision (e) makes
adequate reference to the $250,000 lump sum so that it is clear that this amount is to be deducted
from the gross future damages before proceeding with the subdivision (e) calculation.
147. See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 116-17 and 121-27 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 138.
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§ 5043. Posting and maintaining security
(a) If the court enters a judgment for periodic installments, each party
liable for all or a portion of such judgment shall separately or jointly with
one or more others post security in an amount necessary to secure payment
for the amount of the judgment for future periodic installments within
thirty days after the date the judgment is entered. A liability insurer having
a contractual obligation and any other person adjudged to have an obliga-
tion to pay all or part of a judgment for periodic installments on behalf of a
judgment debtor is obligated to post security to the extent of its contractual
or adjudged obligation if the judgment debtor has not done so. Once secur-
ity is posted in compliance with section five thousand forty-two and section
five thousand forty-three, the plaintiff shall then release the liable party for
whom security has been posted.
Rationale: This change protects the tax-free nature of the judgment for
the plaintiff150 and frees the defendant from the burden of a judgment
after she has satisfied her obligations under the statute.
(b) A judgment creditor or successor in interest and any party having
rights may move that the court find that security has not been posted and
maintained with regard to a judgment obligation owing to the moving
party. Upon so finding, the court shall order that security complying with
this article be posted within thirty days. If the security is not posted within
that time and subdivision (c) of this section does not apply, the court shall
enter a judgment for the lump sum as such sum is determinable under the
law without regard to this article.
(c) If a judgment debtor who is the only person liable for a portion of
a judgment for periodic installments fails to post and maintain security, the
right to lump sum payment described in subdivision (b) of this section ap-
plies only against that judgment debtor and the portion of judgment so
owed.
(d) If more than one party is liable for all or a portion of a judgment
requiring security under this article and the required security is posted by
one or more but fewer than all of the parties liable, the security require-
ments are satisfied and those posting security may proceed under subdivi-
sion (b) of this section to enforce rights for security or lump sum payment
to satisfy or protect rights of reimbursement from a party not posting
security.
§ 5044. Failure to make payment
If at any time following entry of judgment, ajudgmentdeb an annu-
ity company fails for any reason to make a payment in a timely fashion
according to the terms of this article, the judgment creditor may petition
the court which rendered the original judgment for an order requiring pay-
ment by the judgment-debtr annuity company of the outstanding pay-
150. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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ments in a lump sum. In calculating the amount of the lump sum
judgment, the court shall total the remaining periodic payments due and
owing to the judgment creditor, as calculated pursuant to subdivision (b) (e)
of section five thousand forty-one of this article, and shall not convert these
amounts to their present value. The court may also require the payment of
interest on the outstanding judgment.
Rationale: These changes shift the responsibility for payment of the
award from the defendant to the annuity company once security has been
posted and the defendant has satisfied her obligations under the statute.
The change from "(b)" to "(e)" corrects a cross-referencing problem.15
§ 5045. Effect of death of judgment creditor
(a) Unless otherwise agreed between the parties at the time security is
posted pursuant to section five thousand forty-three of this article, in all
cases covered by this article in which future damages are payable in peri-
odic installments, the liability for payment of any installments for medical,
dental or other costs of health care or non-economic loss not yet due at the
death of the judgment creditor terminates upon the death of the judgment
creditor.
Rationale: This non-apparent alteration continues the integration of the
two Articles by including malpractice actions within the reference to per-
sonal injury.
(b) The portion of any periodic payment allocable to loss of future
earnings shall not be reduced or terminated by reason of the death of the
judgment creditor, but shall be paid to persons to whom the judgment cred-
itor owed a duty of support immediately prior to his death to the extent
that such duty of support exists under applicable law at the time of the
death of the judgment creditor. Such payments to such persons shall con-
tinue for the remainder of the period as originally found by the jury or until
such duty of support ceases to exist, whichever occurs first. In such cases,
the court which rendered the original judgment may, upon petition of any
party in interest, modify the judgment to award and apportion the future
payments of such unpaid future damages in accordance with this subdivi-
sion which apportioned amounts shall be payable in the future as provided
for in this article. In the event that the judgment creditor does not owe a
duty of support to any person at the time of death of the judgment creditor
or such duty ceases to exist, the remaining payments shall be considered
part of the estate of the judgment creditor. In such cases, the court which
rendered the original judgment may, upon petition of any party in interest,
convert those portions of such periodic payments allocable to the loss of
future earnings to a lump sum by calculating the present value of such pay-
ments in order to assist in the settlement of the estate of the creditor.
151. See supra note 139.
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§ 5046. Adjustments of payments
(a) If, at any time after entry of judgment, a judgment creditor or suc-
cessor in interest can establish that the continued payment of the judgment
in periodic installments will impose a hardship, the court may, in its discre-
tion, order that the remaining payments, or a portion thereof, for medical,
dental, or other health needs shall be made to the judgment creditor in a
lump sum. The court shall, before entering such an order, find that:
(i) unantici ated and .ubstan. medical, dental or other health needs
which could not have been anticipated and which are substantial have
arisen that warrant the payment of the remaining payments, or a portion
thereof, in a lump sum; (ii) ordering such a lump sum payment would not
impose an unreasonable financial burden on the annuity company or the
judgment debtor or debtors; (iii) ordering such a lump sum payment will
accommodate the future medical, dental and other health needs of the judg-
ment creditor; and (iv) ordering such lump sum payment would further the
interests of justice.
Rationale: The insertion of the phrase "medical, dental and other
health" is a minor change that integrates the two sections while retaining
the broader language of the two. The rephrasing of subdivision (i) makes
it clear that the proper standard is whether the trier of fact could have
anticipated these needs. The addition of the term "annuity company"
requires consideration of the burden to the party who is responsible for
the payments.
152
(b) If a lump sum payment is ordered by the court, such lump sum
shall be:
(i) calculated on the basis of the present value of remaining peri-
odic payments, or portions thereof, that are converted into a lump sum
payment. Unless specifically waived by all parties, the annuity contract ex-
ecuted pursuant to section five thousand forty-two of this article shall con-
tain a provision authorizing such a lump sum payment if such payment is
approved pursuant to this section. The remaining future periodic pay-
ments, if any, shall be reduced accordingly. For the purposes of this sec-
tion, present value shall be calculated based on the interest rate and
mortality assumptions at the time such a payment is made as determined by
the insurer who has provided the annuity contract, in accordance with the
regulations issued by the superintendent of insurance. The subdivision (i)
shall apply only when subdivision (ii) of this subsection does not apply.
(ii) made by the medical malpractice insurance association cre-
ated pursuant to article fifty-five of the insurance law and shall not be the
obligation of the insurer providing the initial annuity contract. Such in-
surer shall thereafter make all future payments due under its annuity con-
tract to the association, except that, if the lump sum payment ordered by
the court is a portion of the remaining periodic payments, such insurer shall
152. See supra note 140 for the discussion of § 5036/46.
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appropriately apportion future payments due under its annuity contract be-
tween the association and the judgment creditor or successor in interest.
Such lump sum payment to be paid to the judgment creditor or successor in
interest by the association shall be calculated on the basis of the present
value of the annuity contract, which shall be based on its cost at such time,
for remaining periodic payments, or portions thereof, that are converted
into a lump sum payment. In no event shall such lump sum payment be
greater than the present value of the annuity contract for the remaining
periodic payments. This subdivision (ii) shall apply to judgments rendered
in medical, dental or podiatric malpractice actions.
Rationale: This creation of subdivisions is necessary since this is the only
place where the two Articles differ to a degree that prevents integration.
§ 5047. Settlements
Nothing in this article shall be construed to limit the right of a plain-
tiff, defendant or defendants and any insurer to settle property damage, per-
sonal injury or wrongful death claims as they consider appropriate and in
their complete discretion.
Rationale: This alteration completes the integration of the two Articles.
§ 5048. Assignment of periodic installments
An assignment of or an agreement to assign any right to periodic in-
stallments for future damages contained in a judgment entered under this
article is enforceable only as to amounts: (a) to secure payment of alimony,
maintenance, or child support; or (b) for the cost of products, services, or
accommodations provided or to be provided by the assignee for medical,
dental or other health care., or (e) for attoerny's fm .ad othr expeses e
ifiatJAJ ineurrd in seurng the edgiment.
Rationale: This change reflects the idea that the assignment of attorney's
fees is anomalous since attorney's fees are normally controlled by a re-
tainer agreement, and encompass all costs, including those incurred in
entering judgment, associated with the case. 5 '
§ 5049. Duties of the superintendent of insurance
The superintendent of insurance shall establish rules and procedures
for determining which insurers, self-insurers, plans or arrangements are fi-
nancially qualified to provide the security required under this article and to
be designated as qualified insurers.




Structured settlements are deeply entrenched in the landscape of
personal injury litigation. They reduce settlement costs for the defend-
ant, help prevent dissipation of awards by the plaintiff and provide tax
benefits to both parties. These benefits are also available if judgments are
structured. Escalating jury verdicts and the insurance crisis made it in-
evitable that some jurisdictions would enact mandatory structured judg-
ment legislation. New York is one of thirty states to have enacted some
form of a periodic payment statute by 1990.
The discount rate and the inflation rate are the most critical ele-
ments of any framework for structured settlements or judgments. There
are many mathematical models that courts have used in their attempts to
inflate and discount verdicts. Traditionally, courts recognized only dis-
counting. Later, some courts assumed that rates totally offset each other
and thereby disregarded any potential effect of inflation and discounting.
Other courts have combined real and nominal rates or have offset real
and nominal rates, with unpredictable results. A final approach has been
to obtain an annual average of inflated amounts for use as the annual
payment to be discounted. All of these approaches are mathematically
flawed.
The Nominal Rates Approach utilizes nominal rates for growth and
discounting. This approach is mathematically accurate, utilizes nominal
rates, which are familiar to most attorneys, jurors and judges, and allows
for greater advocacy and flexibility in the process of determining both
rates. In order to facilitate the use of the Nominal Rates Approach in
New York, however, Article 50 must be amended. Subdivision (e) of
§ 5031/41 is the heart of Article 50 and is in need of the most work. The
4% provision of this subdivision should be removed to allow for advo-
cacy by attorneys regarding the proper growth rate to be used and to
prevent repetition of this calculation. Subdivision (e) should also be
amended to allow the trier of fact to set the "nominal" growth rate based
on evidence of economic conditions presented at trial. Since some post-
verdict adjustments are made to future values and some are made to
present values, subdivisions (a), (d) and (e) of § 5031/41 should be
amended to reflect this and to alleviate confusion and error. Subdivisions
(c) and (e) should be amended so that attorneys receive that percentage
of the present value which was agreed upon in the retainer agreement.
Article 50 has become an accepted part of the New York litigation
landscape. It makes many positive contributions, but since it is
mandatory, unless waived, it must be amended to correct its faults.
[Vol. 40
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Often, only implementation and use can reveal the problems of any statu-
tory scheme. The weaknesses of the statute are now evident and the leg-
islature should act to correct them.
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APPENDIX
The text of Article 50 is set forth below. Text common to Articles
50-A and 50-B is printed in ordinary roman type. Text unique to Article
50-A is underlined. Text unique to Article 50-B is italicized.
§ 5041. Basis for determining judgment to be entered
In order to determine what judgment is to be entered on a verdict in
an action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property or
wrongful death dental, medical or podiatric malpractice under this arti-
cle, and not subject to article fifty-A of this chapter, the court shall pro-
ceed as follows:
(a) The court shall apply to the findings of past and future damages
any applicable rules of law, including set-offs, credits, comparative negli-
gence pursuant to section fourteen hundred eleven of this chapter, ad-
diturs, and remittiturs, in calculating the respective amounts of past and
future damages claimants are entitled to recover and defendants are obli-
gated to pay.
(b) The court shall enter judgment in lump sum for past damages,
for future damages not in excess of two hundred fifty thousand dollars,
and for any damages, fees or costs payable in lump sum of otherwise
under subdivisions (c) and (d) of this section. For the purposes of this
section, any lump sum payment of a portion of future damages shall be
deemed to include the elements of future damages in the same proportion
as such elements comprise of the total award for future damages as deter-
mined by the trier of fact.
(c) Payment of litigation expenses and that portion of the attorney's
fees related to past damages shall be payable in a lump sum. Payment of
that portion of the attorney's fees related to future damages for which,
pursuant to this article, the claimant is entitled to a lump sum payment
shall also be payable in a lump sum. Payment of that portion of the
attorney's fees related to the future periodically paid damages shall also
be payable in a lump sum, based on the present value of the annuity
contract purchased to provide payment of such future periodically paid
damages pursuant to subdivision (e) of this section.
(d) Upon election of a subrogee or a lien holder, including an em-
ployer or insurer who provides workers' compensation, filed within the
time permitted by rule of court, any part of future damages allocable to
reimbursement of payments previously made by the subrogee or the lien
holder shall be paid in lump sum to the subrogee or the lien holder in
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such amount as is calculable and determinable under the law in effect at
the time of such payment.
(e) With respect to awards of future damages in excess of two hun-
dred fifty thousand dollars in an action to recover damages for personal
injury, injury to property or wrongful death, dental, medical or podiatric
malpractice, the court shall enter judgment as follows:
After making any adjustment prescribed by subdivisions (b), (c) and
(d) of this section, the court shall enter a judgment for the amount of the
present value of an annuity contract that will provide for the payment of
the remaining amounts of future damages in periodic installments. The
present value of such contract shall be determined in accordance with
generally accepted actuarial practices by applying the discount rate in
effect at the time of the award to the full amount of the remaining future
damages, as calculated pursuant to this subdivision. The period of time
over which such periodic payments shall be made and the period of time
used to calculate the present value of the annuity contract shall be the
period of years determined by the trier of fact in arriving at the itemized
verdict; provided, however, that the period of time over which such peri-
odic payments shall be made and the period of time used to calculate the
present value for damages attributable to pain and suffering shall be ten
years or the period of time determined by the trier of fact, whichever is
less. The court, as part of its judgment, shall direct that the defendants
and their insurance carriers shall be required to offer and to guarantee
the purchase and payment of such an annuity contract. Such annuity
contract shall provide for the payment of the annual payments of such
remaining future damages over the period of time determined pursuant
to this subdivision. The annual payment for the first year shall be calcu-
lated by dividing the remaining amount of future damages by the number
of years over which such payments shall be made and the payment due in
each succeeding year shall be computed by adding four percent to the
previous year's payment. Where payment of a portion of the future dam-
ages terminates in accordance with the provisions of this article, the four
percent added payment shall be based only upon that portion of the dam-
ages that remains subject to continued payment. Unless otherwise
agreed, the annual sum so arrived at shall be paid in equal monthly in-
stallments and in advance.
(f) With the consent of the claimant and any party liable, in whole
or in part, for the judgment, the court shall enter judgment for the
amount found for future damages attributable to said party as such are
determinable without regard to the provisions of this article.
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§ 5042. Form of security
Security authorized or required for payment of a judgment for peri-
odic installments entered in accordance with this article must be in the
form of an annuity contract, executed by a qualified insurer and ap-
proved by the superintendent of insurance pursuant to section five thou-
sand forty-nine thirty-nine of this article, and approved by the court.
§ 5043. Posting and maintaining security
(a) If the court enters a judgment for periodic installments, each
party liable for all or a portion of such judgment shall separately or
jointly with one or more others post security in an amount necessary to
secure payment for the amount of the judgment for future periodic in-
stallments within thirty days after the date the judgment is entered. A
liability insurer having a contractual obligation and any other person ad-
judged to have an obligation to pay all or part of a judgment for periodic
installments on behalf of a judgment debtor is obligated to post security
to the extent of its contractual or adjudged obligation if the judgment
debtor has not done so.
(b) A judgment creditor or successor in interest and any party hav-
ing rights may move that the court find that security has not been posted
and maintained with regard to a judgment obligation owing to the mov-
ing party. Upon so finding, the court shall order that security complying
with this article be posted within thirty days. If the security is not posted
within that time and subdivision (c) of this section does not apply, the
court shall enter a judgment for the lump sum as such sum is determina-
ble under the law without regard to this article.
(c) If a judgment debtor who is the only person liable for a portion
of a judgment for periodic installments fails to post and maintain secur-
ity, the right to lump sum payment described in subdivision (b) of this
section applies only against that judgment debtor and the portion of
judgment so owed.
(d) If more than one party is liable for all or a portion of a judgment
requiring security under this article and the required security is posted by
one or more but fewer than all of the parties liable, the security require-
ments are satisfied and those posting security may proceed under subdivi-
sion (b) of this section to enforce rights for security or lump sum




§ 5044. Failure to make payment
If at any time following entry of judgment, a judgment debtor fails
for any reason to make a payment in a timely fashion according to the
terms of this article, the judgment creditor may petition the court which
rendered the original judgment for an order requiring payment by the
judgment debtor of the outstanding payments in a lump sum. In calcu-
lating the amount of the lump sum judgment, the court shall total the
remaining periodic payments due and owing to the judgment creditor, as
calculated pursuant to subdivision (b) of section five thousand forty-one
thirty-one of this article, and shall not convert these amounts to their
present value. The court may also require the payment of interest on the
outstanding judgment.
§ 5045. Effect of death of judgment creditor
(a) Unless otherwise agreed between the parties at the time security
is posted pursuant to section five thousand forty-three thirty-three of this
article, in all cases covered by this article in which future damages are
payable in periodic installments, the liability for payment of any install-
ments for medical, dental or other costs of health care or non-economic
loss not yet due at the death of the judgment creditor terminates upon
the death of the judgment creditor.
(b) The portion of any periodic payment allocable to loss of future
earnings shall not be reduced or terminated by reason of the death of the
judgment creditor, but shall be paid to persons to whom the judgment
creditor owed a duty of support immediately prior to his death to the
extent that such duty of support exists under applicable law at the time
of the death of the judgement creditor. Such payments to such persons
shall continue for the remainder of the period as originally found by the
jury or until such duty of support ceases to exist, whichever occurs first.
In such cases, the court which rendered the original judgment may, upon
petition of any party in interest, modify the judgment to award and ap-
portion the future payments of such unpaid future damages in accord-
ance with this subdivision which apportioned amounts shall be payable
in the future as provided for in this article. In the event that the judg-
ment creditor does not owe a duty of support to any person at the time of
the death of the judgment creditor or such duty ceases to exist, the re-
maining payments shall be considered part of the estate of the judgment
creditor. In such cases, the court which rendered the original judgment
may, upon petition of any party in interest, convert those portions of
such periodic payments allocable to the loss of future earnings to a lump
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sum by calculating the present value of such payments in order to assist
in the settlement of the estate of the judgment creditor.
§ 5046. Adjustment of payments
(a) If, at any time after entry of judgment, a judgment creditor or
successor in interest can establish that the continued payment of the
judgment in periodic installments will impose a hardship, the court may,
in its discretion, order that the remaining payments or a portion thereof
shall be made to the judgment creditor in a lump sum. The court shall,
before entering such an order, find that: (i) unanticipated and substan-
tial medical, dental or other health medical, dental or other needs have
arisen that warrant the payment of the remaining payments, or a portion
thereof, in a lump sum; (i) ordering such a lump sum payment would
not impose an unreasonable financial burden on the judgment debtor or
debtors; (iii) ordering such a lump sum payment will accommodate the
future medical, dental and other health medical and other needs of the
judgment creditor; and (iv) ordering such lump sum payment would fur-
ther the interests of justice.
(b) If a lump sum payment is ordered by the court, such lump sum
payment shall be calculated on the basis of the present value of remaining
periodic payments, or portions thereof, that are converted into a lump sum
payment. Unless specifically waived by all parties, the annuity contract
executed pursuant to section five thousand forty-two of this article shall
contain a provision authorizing such a lump sum payment ifsuch payment
is approved pursuant to this section. The remaining future periodic pay-
ments, if any, shall be reduced accordingly. For the purposes of this sec-
tion, present value shall be calculated based on the interest rate and
mortality assumptions at the time such a lump sum payment is made as
determined by the insurer who has provided the annuity contract, in ac-
cordance with the regulations issued by the superintendent of insurance.
made by the medical malpractice insurance association created pursuant
to article fifty-five of the insurance law and shall not be the obligation of
the insurer providing the initial annuity contract. Such insurer shall
thereafter make all future payments due under its annuity contract to the
association, except that, if the lump sum payment ordered by the court is
a portion of the remaining periodic payments, such insurer shall appro-
priately apportion future payments due under its annuity contract be-
tween the association and the judgment creditor or successor in interest.
Such lump sum payment to be paid to the judgment creditor or successor
in interest by the association shall be calculated on the basis of the pres-
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ent value of the annuity contract, which shall be based on its cost at such
time, for remaining periodic payments, or portions thereof, that are con-
verted into a lump sum payment. In no event shall such lump sum pay-
ment be greater that the present value of the annuity contract for the
remaining periodic payments.
§ 5047. Settlements
Nothing in this article shall be construed to limit the right of a
plaintiff, defendant or defendants and any insurer to settle property dam-
age, personal injury or wrongful death dental, medical or podiatric mal-
practice claims as they consider appropriate and in their complete
discretion.
§ 5048. Assignment of periodic installments
An assignment of or an agreement to assign any right to periodic
installments for future damages contained in a judgment entered under
this article is enforceable only as to amounts: (a) to secure payment of
alimony, maintenance, or child support; (b) for the cost of products,
services, or accommodations provided or to be provided by the assignee
for medical, dental or other health care; or (c) for attorney's fees and
other expenses of litigation incurred in securing the judgment.
§ 5049. Duties of superintendent of insurance
The superintendent of insurance shall establish rules and procedures
for determining which insurers, self-insurers, plans or arrangements are
financially qualified to provide the security required under this article
and to be designated as qualified insurers.
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